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Video: Attack On Dhaka

NBC News (3/29/1971): Attack On Dhaka

NBC News report from 3/29/1971 shows a video taken from the Intercontinental Hotel in Dhaka on 3/26/1971 by a French video crew before they were expelled from Bangladesh by the Pakistan army. This is a rare smuggled video of the Pakistan army crackdown that launched 9 months of genocide in Bangladesh.

All foreign reporters were confined to the Intercontinental Hotel when the Pakistan army started its crackdown on the night of 3/25/1971. The reporters were expelled from the country two days later. Their notes and video footage were confiscated. However, a French news crew managed to smuggle out the video they had taken through the windows of their hotel room. In the video, Dhaka is seen burning and tanks are seen on the streets near the hotel.

[Click for high-resolution video]

By Mashuqur Rahman

Pakistanis were misled into thinking that Bangladeshis were Hindus

Noted Pakistani writer Ahmad Salim has said that before the independence of Bangladesh the Pakistan government told the people of the then West Pakistan that the then East Pakistanis were Hindu due to their multi-dimensional culture.

Ahmad SelimSalim, a former professor of the Karachi University, said that in 1971 the people of West Pakistan were in the dark totally about what was really going on in the eastern part due to the false and malicious propaganda of the then military rulers of Pakistan.

Ahmad Salim, honorary coordinator of the South Asian Research and Resource Centre under the SAARC secretariat who is visiting Bangladesh, was giving a lecture on ‘Creative Responses in West Pakistan Regarding the Tragedy of 1971’ on Saturday.

The lecture at the RC Majumdar Arts Auditorium of Dhaka University was organised by Unnayan Onneshan, a centre for development research and action.

Presided over by Zaheda Ahmed, professor of history department of DU, the discussion meeting was attended, among others, by the chairman of Unnayan Onneshan, Rashed Al Mahmud Titumir.

Ahmad Selim, who suffered jail terms for writing against military atrocity in Bangladesh in 1971, also said that there were a good number of poems and other writings in different languages by renowned Pakistani writers protesting against the West Pakistani attack on East Pakistan. ‘But most of them were banned by the military rulers,’ he said.

A book containing the writings of Pakistani wordsmiths about the West Pakistani oppression of East Pakistan in 1971 will be published simultaneously in Pakistan and Bangladesh within a few months, said Salim.

He said the book, titled ‘Another Side of a Medal’, would be a compilation of writings that will explain a lot about the thoughts of the Pakistani people who did not agree with the atrocities of the then Pakistani government on the Bangladeshi people.

The New Age, May 20, 2007

Skewing the history of rape in 1971 A prescription for reconciliation?

Nayanika Mookherjee runs a critical eye over Sarmila Bose’s controversial analysis of the violence committed during the Liberation War:

This is a discussion of Sarmila Bose’s article: “Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971” (EPW, Oct 8, 2005). A version of this paper was first presented by Dr Bose at a two-day conference, on June 28-29, 2005, organized by the historian branch of the United States Department of State titled “South Asia in Crisis: United States Policy, 1961-1972.” This was arranged to mark the release of declassified US records relating to the theme of the conference.

As an Indian working in Bangladesh for nearly a decade on the public memories of sexual violence during the Bangladesh war of 1971, I was particularly struck by the author’s use of the phrase “civil war” to refer to the Bangladesh war. Most Bangladeshis denounce the use of the term “civil war” to refer to the Bangladesh war as it deflects attention from its genocidal connotations.Instead, they semantically and politically distinguish the Bangladesh war as either muktijuddho (liberation war) or shadhinotar juddho(independence war).

It is also important to note that occurring at the juncture of Cold War politics, with the United States government supporting Pakistan during 1971, and the Indian government assisting the East Pakistani guerrilla fighters, the genocidal connotations of the Bangladesh war remains unacknowledged, till date. The use of the phrase “civil war” in the title of the article suggests that the author was in agreement with the Pakistani and US government’s version of events of 1971. Yet the paper was claiming to provide “an impartial account.” I was intrigued.

Through what Bose refers to as “case studies,” she tries to highlight how violence was inflicted by both sides — the Pakistani army and the East Pakistani liberation fighters — during the 1971 war. She also refers to the lack of incidents of rape during the Bangladesh war in her “cases” in a small paragraph found at the end of her long article. She suggests a prescription for reconciliation through an acknowledgement of violence inflicted by all parties involved.

Soon after the Washington conference, the points made in her paper were promptly picked up by the Pakistani newspapers: The Daily Times (Hasan, June 30,2005; Editorial, July 2, 2005) and Dawn (Iqbal, July 7, 2005). Both refer to the violence inflicted by both sides, and the absence of rape during the Bangladesh war. The entry on Sarmila Bose in Wikipedia, the popular internet encyclopedia, reiterates only the brief paragraph on rape.

In a response to Uttorshuri, a Bangladeshi web mail group, on July 2, 2005, Bose said: “The heading given to the Daily Times, Pakistan, report is incorrect and not the finding of my study.” Her work unleashed a barrage of criticism in Bangladesh and her research methods have been attacked as being shoddy and biased.

Collingwood (1945) has shown that historical “facts” are the reconstitution of the past in the historian’s minds, involving the selection and interpretation of the past, as history is the choice of a particular expository style that is itself determined historically.

My discussion of Bose’s article here, nearly ten months after the publication of her article in EPW, is an attempt to show the various responses to Bose’s work, her response to these feedbacks and to highlight Bose’s expository style which is appropriated by varied configurations.

In this discussion, I critically address Bose’s exposition about: a) violence being inflicted on both sides, b) the lack of instances of rape in her “cases,” and c) interrogate her formulation of reconciliation and highlight its implications on sub-continental politics.

Violence inflicted on both sides
All parties involved are shown to “commit acts of brutality outside accepted norms of warfare, and all had their share of humanity …with Bengalis, Biharis and West Pakistanis helping one another in the midst of mayhem,” in Bose’s article. This is evidenced by the Pakistan army targeting adult males while sparing women and children. However, local Bengali “loyalists”/collaborators, and not the Pakistani army, are involved in inflicting violence on their fellow Bengalis and the killing of intellectuals.

According to these accounts the Pakistani army did not inflict all the violence. This decontextualized account of Bengali collaborators does not recognize the triggers and advantages that the presence of, and collaboration with, the Pakistani army created. It misses the analytical point that in all wars local collaborators become the indispensable foot-soldiers of the institutionalized military paraphernalia.

The Pakistani army is portrayed as kind, but violent when provoked, whereas the Bengalis inflict violence “for unfathomable reasons.” The situation in Bangladesh during 1971 is described through phrases like: “widespread lawlessness during March,” “encouraged to break the law,” “urban terrorism,” and “rebels.”

The treatment of the Pakistani army namely: “refusal of Bengalis to sell them food and fuel, being jeered and spat at … and the widespread disregard of curfew orders, murder of army personnel,” are not considered to be examples of resistance and opposition, but are cited as instances of the suffering of the Pakistani army and an exhibition of “extraordinary restraint of the army under provocation.”

The “rule of law” remains with the Pakistani army as they “secure” and “gain control” over territories. Army reaction is cited as “overwhelming” while the rebels are “disorganised and amateurish” who for “unfathomable reasons … take pot-shots at the advancing units in the bazaar which triggered an overwhelming reaction from the army.”

There is no commentary on the contestations that exist in Bangladesh in relation to the varied national narratives of 1971. As a result, the observation by the former liberation fighter Iqbal: “This must be the only country in the world where there are two views on the independence of the country,” remains unanalysed.

As in-depth reading of various critical literature on war and violence (Butalia 1998; Das 1995; Nordstrom 2004) would show liberation and independence of countries are not homogenous narratives, and contain within their folds multiple contesting interrogations of wars through which countries become free. This is more so the case in Bangladesh (Hitchens 2001), given its fractured histories of partitions and independence.

Also, Nixon’s reference to Bangladesh as the “place” remains uncommented upon. This article, which was first presented in a conference hosted by the US department of State, is particularly conspicuous in the absence of any critical examination of the US support for Pakistan’s role in the Bangladesh war of 1971, in the context of Cold War calculations.

The article is helpful in addressing the ethnicization of the army as “Punjabis,” and in bringing out some of the nuances of the Pakistani army. That wars and conflicts are rife with instances of violence, kindness, cowardice, complicity, contradictions by the same individuals is not anything new and has been highlighted by various feminists, critical researchers and filmmakers within Bangladesh (Akhtar et al. 2001; Choudhury 2001; Kabir 2003; Masud 1999, 2000).

They show the multiple, contradictory, subjectivities of the Bangladesh war experience, and the violence inflicted upon the poor, women, Biharis, and adivasis. In my own work, I have encountered similar complicities and contradictions. Rather than citing these experiences as ahistorical and apolitical “facts,” they need to be located at the crossroads of local and national politics and histories.

The earlier mentioned formulation by Collingwood is significant here. In her other writings, Bose has attempted to go beyond Indo-Pakistani enmities. She highlights the various symbolic roles of a flag, and the possible repercussions of possessing a Pakistani flag in India (Bose 2003). In the Christian Science Monitor she argues (Bose and Milam 2005) in support of the sale of F-16s to Pakistan as a stabilizing factor within world and sub-continental geo-politics. In the EPW article, the nature of her expository style and presentation of “facts” make her “cases” representative of war-time experiences of all in Bangladesh.

Skewing the history of rape
The small paragraph, located in the last page of the article, relating to the absence of rape in the “cases” has been highlighted as evidence that the Pakistani army did not rape. In her response to Uttorshuri, Bose says: “The issue of rape amounted to about 100 words out of a nearly 6,500 word paper on the subject of patterns of violence in 1971.” An issue as contentious as the “patterns” of violence of rape can be claimed to be absent, through only 100 words! Bose explicates: “As I pointed out in the discussion that followed, there is evidence elsewhere that rape certainly occurred in 1971. But it seems — from this study and other works — that it may not have occurred in all the instances it is alleged to have occurred.”

Bose’s comment that rapes did occur elsewhere in 1971 is absent in her EPW article. In it she emphasizes the need to distinguish between the instances where rape occurred and where it did not. Throughout, it shows that the Bengalis raped Biharis while the Pakistani army did not rape anyone during the war. Also, it is not very clear which “cases” are being referred to in the statement: the rapes “may not have occurred in all the instances they are alleged to have occurred.” Rather than this generalized statement, it would have been more transparent scholarship to cite the specific “cases” where the rapes were alleged which the research instead finds, is absent.

Bose shows, in the case of “mutinies” by “rebels,” that “there was assault and abduction” of women. The Pakistani army however, “always” targeted adult males while sparing women and children. The Hamdoodur Rahman Commission (2000) established by the Pakistani government, while referring to the attack and rape of pro-Pakistani elements by Bengalis, also cites various instances of rape.

Eyewitness accounts can also be found in the eighth volume of the Dolil (Rahman 1982-85: 106, 192, 385). There is literature from the 1970s (Greer 1972; Brownmiller 1975) and recent scholarship and films based on oral history from within Bangladesh (Akhtar 2001; Choudhury 2001; Guhathakurta 1996; Ibrahim 1994, 1995; Kabir 2003; Masud 2000) which shows that the Pakistani army committed rapes and highlights the complexities of these violent encounters. Bose makes no reference to any of these documentations.

Recently, in Bangladesh, various women from different socio-economic backgrounds have narrated their violent experiences of rape by the Pakistani army and local collaborators. The well-known sculptor, Ferdousy Priyobhashini, has been vocal about her war-time experiences and the role of Pakistani army and Bengalis. My own work with various women who were raped during the war shows the contradictions of the war-time experiences while highlighting their violent encounters. All these documentations emerge as important counter-narratives to the various prevalent Bangladeshi nationalist accounts of the war.

Emphasizing these war-time contradictions is not tantamount to a denial of the incidents of rape perpetrated by Pakistani army and their local collaborators.

A prescription for reconciliation?
Reconciliation, according to Bose, is possible through an acknowledgement of violence inflicted by all parties involved. However, for her, this is hinged on an unequal reliance on literally accepting the various viewpoints of the Pakistani army and administration, drawn from secondary sources (only one interview with General Niazi is briefly quoted).

While referring to the innumerable publications on 1971 as a “cottage industry,” Bose seems to negate the emotive expressions of her informants as “the cultivation of an unhealthy victim culture” and a “ghoulish competition with six million Jews in order to gain international attention.” This highlights a lack of empathy with her informants, and insensitivity to their comprehension of violence.

Primo Levi’s work on Auschwitz shows that individuals who have encountered and survived violence make various complicated, competitive and contradictory negotiations to inhabit their survival and “victimhood.” Here, Bangladeshi testimonials are ironically the means through which war-time narratives are negated.

The various individual accounts of violence, in turn, become muted with the prescription of “reconciliation.” Significantly, for many Bangladeshis, “reconciliation” has a jarring resonance, as it is perceived to be the objective of various war-time collaborators, who are currently rehabilitated in the Bangladeshi political landscape.

Seen only as a “place” (Nixon), a “basket case” (Kissinger), Bangladesh is stereotypically viewed internationally, and in South Asia, as a country ravaged only by poverty, floods, cyclones and, hence, in need of the saviour, interventionist, developmental paradigms.

Here, Bangladeshi histories and politics are again delegitimized as a result of sub-continental dynamics, as there is no engagement with the wider picture in Bangladesh.

The expositions in this article itself stand in the way of reconciliation between Bangladesh and Pakistan, and cannot provide a prescription to resolve these hostilities. War-time contradictions, complicities, nuances can be highlighted without negating the foundational violence of the history of rape of the Bangladesh war perpetrated by the Pakistani army and the local collaborators.

While the Bangladesh war might be a “civil war,” or Indo-Pakistan war for India and Pakistan, for most Bangladeshis it is the war of liberation and independence, even though that liberation might be interrogated in post-colonial Bangladesh. Only by recentring the issues which concern Bangladesh, along with highlighting the contradictions of wartime experiences, rather than proffering an argument which caters to Indo-Pakistan geo-political concerns, could one help the cause of reconciliation between Pakistan and Bangladesh.

This piece is adapted from “Bangladesh War of 1971: A Prescription for Reconciliation?” EPW, Vol. 41 No 36: 3901-3903. We have reprinted it here by special arrangement with EPW due to the intense interest within Bangladesh generated by the original Bose article that Dr Mookherjee discusses.

Dr Nayanika Mookherjee is a Lecturer in the Sociology Department in Lancaster University and a Research Fellow for the Society of South Asian Studies, British Academy.

References
Akhtar, Shaheen, Suraiya Begum, Hameeda Hossain, Sultana Kamal, and Meghna Guhathakurta, eds. 2001. Narir Ekattor O Juddhoporoborti Koththo Kahini (Oral History Accounts of Women’s Experiences During 1971 and After the War). Dhaka: Ain-O-Shalish-Kendro (ASK).

Bose, Sarmila. 2005. “Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971,” Economic and Political Weekly, October 8, 2005.http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.p…&filetype=html

Bose, Sarmila and WB Milam. 2005. “The Right Stuff: F-16s to Pakistan is Wise Decision.” Christian Science Monitor, April 11, 2005. http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0411/p09s02-coop.html

Bose, Sarmila. 2003. “What’s in a Flag?” The Daily Times (Pakistan), September 23, 2003. http://www.countercurrents.org/ipk-bose230903.htm

Brownmiller, Susan. 1975. Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, pp. 78-86. London: Secker & Warburg.

Butalia, Urvashi. 1998. The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India. New Delhi: Viking Penguin India.

Collingwood, RG. 1945. The Idea of History. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Das, Veena. 1995. Critical Events, pp. 55-83. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Greer, Germaine. 1972. “The Rape of the Bengali Women.” Sunday Times, April 9, 1972.

Hamdoodur Rahman Commission of Enquiry. 1971. Published in August 2000. Pakistan Government.

Guhathakurta, Meghna. 1996. “Dhorshon Ekti Juddhaporadh” (Rape is a War Crime). Dhaka: Bulletin of Ain-O-Shalish Kendra (ASK), February 6-8.

Hasan, K. 2005. “Army Not Involved in 1971 Rapes.” June 30, 2005. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default…0-6-2005_pg1_2

Hitchens, Christopher. 2001. The Trial of Henry Kissinger. London: Verso.

Ibrahim, Nilima. 1994-5. Ami Birangona Bolchi (This is the “War-Heroine” Speaking), 2 Volumes. Dhaka: Jagriti.

Iqbal, Anwar. 2005. “Sheikh Mujib Wanted a Confederation: US Papers.” July 7, 2005. http://www.dawn.com/2005/07/07/nat3.htm

Levi, Primo. 1996. Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity. Translated from the Italian by Stuart Wolf. New York: Touchstone Books.

Mookherjee, Nayanika. (forthcoming). Specters and Utopias: Sexual Violence, Public Memories and the Bangladesh War of 1971. Durham: Duke University Press.

Mookherjee, Nayanika. 2006. “Remembering to Forget: Public Secrecy and Memory of Sexual Violence in Bangladesh.” Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute (JRAI), 12 (2), June 2006: pp. 433-450.

Mookherjee, Nayanika. 2004. “My Man (Honour) is Lost but I Still Gave my Iman (Principle): Sexual Violence and Articulations of Masculinity.” South Asian Masculinities. R Chopra, C Osella and F Osella, eds. New Delhi: Kali for Women: pp. 131-159.

Nordstrom, Carolyn. 2004. Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century. California Series in Public Anthropology, University of California Press.

Rahman, Hasan H, ed. (1982-1985). Bangladesher Shadhinota Juddho Dolilpotro (Documents of the Bangladesh Independence War). Sixteen Volumes. Dhaka: People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Information Ministry.

Films

Choudhury, Afsan. 2001. Tahader Juddho (Their War).

Kabir, Yasmin. 2003. Shadhinota (A Certain Freedom).

Masud, Tareque and Catherine Masud. 1999. Muktir Katha. (Words of Freedom). Dhaka: Audiovision.

Masud, Tareque and Catherine Masud. 2000. Women and War. Dhaka: Ain-O-Shalish-Kendra (ASK) and Audiovision.

Web-sites
Discussion Forum: Story of Pakistan http://www.storyofpakistan.com/discf……d=11&page=1

Drishtipat: http://drishtipat.org/sarmila/sarmila.htm

IndPride: Sarmila Bose: In Praise of Pakistan http://www.indpride.com/mediamonitor.html

The Daily Times (Pakistan), July 2, 2005. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_2-7 2005_pg3_1

US Department of State South Asia in Crisis: United States Policy, 1961-1972 June 28-29, 2005, Loy Henderson Auditorium, Tentative Program. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/46059.htm

Uttorshuri: “Revisionist Historian on Rapes of 1971,” July 2, 2005.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/uttorshuri/message/4090

Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarmila_Bose

Credit: AK Zaman

An Army Insider’s Honest Expose of Atrocities in East Pakistan Debacle

(A review from a book written by an insider close to power in 1971)

KARACHI, March 25: The East Pakistan tragedy was not just a failure of the military establishment of the day but also the abysmal collapse of civil society in West Pakistan. Launched at midnight, 25 March 1971, the military action went on for nine long months without eliciting any concerted protest from the West Pakistani public and political leadership.

The few low voices raised against the military action were too feeble to make the army change the suicidal course it had set itself, leading to an ignominious military defeat and the breakup of the country.

Brigadier Abdul Rehman Siddiqi, who headed the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) and was Press Advisor to Army Chief General Yahya Khan, was clearly in the thick of things. Therefore, his book ‘East Pakistan: The Endgame — An Onlooker’s Journal 1969-1971’ will be of interest to those wishing to penetrate the historical veil that has subsequently been draped over the more unsavory events of that era.

The author had the unique advantage of observing the tragedy as it unfolded. As the ISPR chief, he interacted with the national press and a cross-section of public and political leadership in both wings. In his description and appraisal of the various dramatis personae, he acts as an impartial observer.

Apart from the fresh light the book sheds on the traumatic episode, the simplicity and candor of the narrative adds much to its readability. Thus, the book may well contribute towards the much-needed bridge building between Pakistan and Bangladesh.

“In 1971, Pakistan was torn into two, its eastern half declaring itself the independent nation of Bangladesh. While the broader details of this debacle have since become comprehensible, historians are still trying to glean a few remaining facts from the myths and half-truths that continue to linger some 33 years later.

From the start, the author makes it clear that the book is based on his diaries and other sources that he had personal access to as the ISPR chief. He also admits to have “scrupulously avoided” relying on any subsequent books or other published material that relates to the events. As a result, the reader is presented with a first-hand account of those fateful days.

The narrative begins in February 1969 when President Ayub Khan, besieged by street agitation, sought to negotiate his way out by calling for a Round Table Conference (RTC). However, as Siddiqi explains, Yahya had already started plotting against his boss. Unknown to most people at the time, the army chief secretly met the East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rehman and asked him not to relent on his demands. In fact, as Siddiqi points out, Yahya went as far as to tell Mujib that “he could go ahead with his anti-Ayub campaign without any let or hindrance from the army.”

Siddiqi also reveals that a week before the RTC, he was ordered by General Ghulam Umar to secretly prepare an advance draft for Yahya’s address to the nation as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Two days later, Yahya flatly refused Ayub’s direct request for the army to come to the aid of the civil government.

According to Siddiqi, Yahya made it abundantly clear to his superior that it was either complete martial law under his own control or nothing. And Ayub knew then that his days were numbered. Following his refusal to help Ayub quell the violent civic unrest, Siddiqi discloses how Yahya cunningly enlisted the support of his old drinking buddy interior minister Admiral AR Khan, who persisted in presenting highly pessimistic daily briefs to further undermine the president.

When Siddiqi confronted General Pirzada with these peculiar goings-on, he was politely told to hush up. The dice had been cast and within a month Ayub departed from the scene after handing over power to Yahya.

Following the takeover, Siddiqi claims that Yahya was quick to reveal his true intentions and confided to some of his senior officers: “Gentlemen, we must be prepared to rule this unfortunate country for the next 14 years or so.”

Soon, Yahya announced general elections after being convinced by the intelligence agencies that they would result in a split vote and a fractious National Assembly, making it impossible for the new government to fulfil the stipulation of an approved constitution within 120 days. This failure, the thinking went, would then lead to fresh elections while power would indefinitely remain in the army’s firm grip.

However, the election results could not have been farther from Yahya’s calculations. Badly let down by the intelligence agencies, Yahya decided to pursue a new course of action. His famous reference to Mujib as the future prime minister was in reality no more than “a calculated maneuver aimed at, first to set the military against Mujib, and second, to provoke the Pakistan Peoples Party.”

The worried generals then recruited Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to ensure that any chance of a compromise with Mujib would be non-existent. In fact, as Siddiqi informs us, General Umar even met many West Pakistani minority party leaders to actively dissuade them from attending the first National Assembly session at Dhaka. Not surprisingly, East Pakistan soon went on the boil in the face of such intransigence. And the army-controlled West Pakistani media retaliated by accusing East Pakistanis of treason.

We all know what followed. The army’s subjugation of East Pakistan resulted in untold misery for millions of innocent Pakistanis, the death of many thousands as well as the breakup of Jinnah’s original Pakistan. And as Siddiqi’s narrative makes apparent, all this happened so that the generals could maintain their hold on power. Since then, it has suited successive army generals to place the blame on Bhutto. But the pertinent question is: how many tanks, guns and soldiers did Bhutto have at his disposal? The answer, of course, is none.

Another fact the author emphasizes is the sheer profusion of war crimes inflicted on hapless Pakistani citizens by its own army. The reader comes across a devastated Major General Ansari telling Siddiqi that rape and brutality were widespread. The general also confesses to a complete breakdown in the “discipline of his junior officers [and that] there was little he could do to check their “atrocities.” If junior officers had run amok, one shudders to think what the less-educated jawans got up to.

Siddiqi also exposes the infamous General Niazi who shamelessly defended the rapists by declaring that: “You cannot expect a man to live, fight and die in East Pakistan and go to Jhelum for sex, would you?” Even 30-plus years later, the fact that most, if not all, of these perpetrators got away scot-free, can provoke tears of rage and shame.

Ultimately, ‘The End Game’ is a brave and honest book and Siddiqi should be commended for writing it, even if it took him all these years to muster the resolve. A must-read for anyone interested in Pakistan’s past.” – Courtesy Herald.

Credit: AK Zaman

Pakistan:The Push toward the Borders

TIME April 26, 1971; pp. 39-40

Radio Pakistan announced last week that Pakistan International Airlines has resumed its internal flight between the East Pakistan capital of Dacca and the town of Jessore, formerly a stronghold of rebel resistance. The broadcast failed to note that the PIA prop jets were carrying only soldiers, and that they were escorted into Jessore airport by air force Sabre jets.

It was true, however, that the army has taken the offensive in Pakistan’s savage civil war. In the early days of fighting, the troops had prudently preferred to remain in their garrison areas, for the most part, until additional men and supplies arrived. Last week they began to push toward the Indian border, hoping to secure the hardtop roads by the time the monsoon rains begin in late May. If they succeed, they will he able to block any sizable imports of arms and other equipment for the Bangla Desh (Bengal State) resistance fighters.

Naxalite Sympathizers. Despite the heavy cost of the operation (estimated at $1.3 million per day) and widespread international criticism, the government of President Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan seems determined to press for a decisive victory. The U.S. and most other Western countries have thus far maintained a careful neutrality. Washington announced that it has furnished no arms to Pakistan since the fighting began March 25. Communist China, on the other hand, has strongly supported the Pakistan government, while India, Pakistan’s traditional adversary, has quietly sympathized with the rebels.

The Indians most deeply involved are the West Bengali insurgents. But West Bengali sympathy is tempered by a fear that a civil war in East Bengal will prove costly to themselves as well. For a generation, West Bengal has received a steady flow of refugees from across the border. Now the flow has greatly increased, with an added burden to the state’s economy. Among West Bengalis, the most enthusiastic supporters of the East Pakistani cause are Calcutta’s urban terrorists, the Maoist Naxalites. Some are said to have slipped across the border with homemade guns and bombs to help the rebels.

Strong Words. Officially, India has tried to maintain calm. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared earlier that India could hardly remain a “silent observer to the carnage in East Pakistan. But last week, when asked if she would describe the fighting as an “imperial war’. she replied sternly. .’the use of strong words will not help.”

From East Pakistan came reports that the destruction was continuing. Estimates of the number of dead ranged to 200,000 or more. In the port city of Chittagong, hundreds of bodies were dumped into the river to be carried away by the tide. Some observers reported a virtual pogrom against East Pakistan’s educated leadership, raising the specter of a region reduced to peasant serfdom. Even the modern jute mills, owned by West Pakistani businessmen, were reported destroyed.

Provisional Government. There was also savagery on the Bengali side. Rebels were reported to be paying off old scores against non-Bengali Moslems who settled in East Pakistan after the 1947 partition of British India into India and Pakistan. At the town of Dinajpur, most male members of this group were killed and the women taken to makeshift internment camps.

Despite the continued absence of their political leader, Sheikh Mlljibur (“Mujib”) Rahman who is thought to be in prison in West Pakistan. the rebels announced the formation of a Bangla Desh provisional government last week. They named Mlljib President. One of his colleagues, Tajuddin Ahmad, who is at large in East Pakistan, became Prime Minister. As their provisional capital, the rebels prudently chose the town of Meherpur, which lies a mere four miles from the Indian border.

The Bangla Desh forces are critically short of gasoline and diesel fuel and lack the field-communication equipment necessary for organized military activity. They have avoided any full-scale engagements, in which they would undoubtedly sustain heavy losses. Some observers believe, in fact, that the long guerrilla phase of the civil war has already begun, with the army holding most of the towns and the rebels controlling much of the countryside. Despite the apparent determination of the Pakistan government to maintain its hold on East Bengal, the sheer human arithmetic of the situation seemed to indicate that the Bengalis would ultimately win freedom or at least some form of regional autonomy. At the present time, the East Bengalis outnumber the West Pakistani soldiers in their midst by about 1,000 to 1.

Pakistan:Round 1 to the West

TIME April 12, 1971; pp. 23-24

THERE is Do doubt,” said a foreign diplomat in East Pakistan last week,” ‘that the word massacre applies to the situation.” Said another Western official: “It’s a veritable bloodbath. The troops have been utterly merciless.”

As Round 1 of Pakistan’s bitter civil war ended last week, the winner-predictably-was the tough West Pakistan army, which has a powerful force of 80,000 Punjabi and Pathan soldiers on duty in rebellious East Pakistan. Reports coming out of the East (via diplomats, frightened refugees and clandestine broadcasts) varied wildly. Estimates of the total dead ran as high as 300,000. A figure of 10,000 to 15,000 is accepted by several Western governments, but no one can be sure of anything except that untold thousands perished.

Mass Graves. Opposed only by bands of Bengali peasants armed with stones and bamboo sticks, tanks rolled through Dacca, the East’s capital, blowing houses to bits. At the university, soldiers slaughtered students inside the British Council building. ..It was like Genghis Khan,’ said a shocked Western official who witnessed the scene. Near Dacca’s marketplace, Urdu-speaking government soldiers ordered Bengali-speaking towns-people to surrender, then gunned them down when they failed to comply. Bodies lay in mass graves at the university, in the Old City, and near the municipal dump.

During rebel attacks on Chittagong, Pakistani naval vessels shelled the port, setting fire to harbor installations. At Jessore, in the southwest, angry Bengalis were said to have hacked alleged government spies to death with staves and spears. Journalists at the Petrapole checkpoint on the Indian border found five bodies and a human head near the frontier post-the remains, apparently, of a group of West Pakistanis who had tried to escape. At week’s end there were reports that East Bengali rebels were maintaining a precarious hold on Jessore and perhaps Chittagong. But in Dacca and most other cities, the rebels had been routed.

The army’s quick victory, however, did not mean that the 58 million West Pakistanis could go on dominating the 78 million Bengalis of East Pakistan indefinitely. The second round may well be a different story. It could be fought out In paddies and jungles and along river banks for months or even years.

Completing the Rupture. The civil war erupted as a result of a victory that was too sweeping, a mandate that was too strong. Four months ago, Pakistan’s President, Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan, held elections for a constituent assembly to end twelve years of martial law. Though he is a Pathan from the West. Yahya was determined to be fair to the Bengalis. He assigned a majority of the assembly seats to Pakistan’s more populous eastern wing, which has been separated from the West by 1,000 miles of India since the partitioning of the subcontinent in 1947.

To everyone’s astonishment, Sheik Mujibur Rahmari and his Awami League won 167 of the 169 seats assigned to the Bengalis, a clear majority in the 313 seat assembly. “I do not want to break Pakistan,” Mujib told TIME shortly before the final rupture two weeks ago. “But we Bengalis must have autonomy so that we are not treated like a colony of the western wing.” Yahya resisted Mujib’s demands for regional autonomy and a withdrawal of troops. Mujib responded by insisting on an immediate end to martial law. Soon the break was complete. Reportedly seized in his Dacca residence at the outset of fighting and flown to West Pakistan, Mujib will probably be tried for treason.

All Normal. West Pakistanis have been told little about the fighting. ALL NORMAL IN EAST was a typical newspaper headline in Karachi last week. Still, they seemed solidly behind Yahya’s tough stand. “We can’t have our flag defiled, our soldiers spat at, our nationality brought into disrepute,” said Pakistan Government Information Chief Khalid Ali. “Mujib in the end had no love of Pakistan.”

Aware that many foreigners were sympathetic to the Bengalis, Yahya permitted the official news agency to indulge in an orgy of paranoia. “Western press reports prove that a deep conspiracy has been hatched by the Indo-Israeli axis against the integrity of Pakistan and the Islamic basis of her ideology,” said the agency.

The Indian government did in fact contribute to the Pakistanis’ anxiety. Although New Delhi denied that India was supplying arms to the Bengali rebels, the Indian Parliament passed a unanimous resolution denouncing the “carnage” in East Pakistan. India’s enthusiasm is hardly surprising, in view of its longstanding feud with the West Pakistanis and the brief but bloody war of 1965 over Kashmir. But Western governments urged New Delhi to restrain itself so as not to provoke West pakistan into making an impulsive response.

Hit and Run. For the time being, West Pakistan’s army can probably maintain its hold on Dacca and the other cities of the East. But it can hardly hope to control 55,000 sq. mi. of countryside and a hostile population indefinitely. The kind of Bengali terrorism that forced the British raj to move the capital from Calcutta to Delhi in 1911 may well manifest itself again in a growing war of hit-and-run sabotage and arson. In modern times, the East Bengalis have been best known to foreigners as mild-mannered peasants, clerks and shopkeepers, perhaps the least martial people on the subcontinent. But in their support of Bangla Desh (Bengal State), they have displayed a fighting spirit that could spell lasting turmoil for those who want Pakistan to remain united. As Mujib often asked his followers rhetorically: “Can bullets suppress 78 million people?”

The Legal Frame-Work Order- A discussion on the liberation war of Bangladesh

The (Legal Frame-Work Order (LFO) is often skipped by many individuals when any discussion comes on the liberation war of Bangladesh. It is a mystery why this important promulgation is excluded from criticism or discussion. Sometimes LFO is not understood and, thus, ignored often by the participants or presenters. It was mentioned first time during Ayub Khan as he emerged as the Military ruler as Prime Minister of Pakistan on October 7, 1958. He captured the office of the President on October 27, 1958 by ousting Iskander Mirza. The LFO did not become much familiar as Ayub concentrated to give a hotchpotch constitution for Pakistan. Thus, hardly anyone remembers about LFO.

The LFO appeared again when Yahya Khan came to the power on March 25, 1969 as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). The political activities were banned outright issuing at least two dozens Martial Law regulations on the same night following last Radio Broadcast of Ayub Khan at 8:15 p.m. The next day Yahya Khan appeared on the Radio and attempted to elaborate on the purpose of his arrival. He asserted to go back to the barrack by giving power to the people elected representatives. Yahya noted firmly to return one month’s tuition fee for the students as they suffered continuity of attending educational institutions. Somehow his address was convincing following a series of unrest events for over three months. Yahya Khan took the office of the President on April 1, 1969. Until then there was no President of the country as was pointed out by several foreign Embassies in Islamabad.

Yahya Khan tried to sell CMLA title in lieu of the President. He argued whether CMLA can replace the title of the President. Since CMLA does not give a smell of the head of the state, Yahya agreed to capture “President” title although he already occupied President’s office. Before the end of May 1969 every student in the then Eastern Pakistan got back one month’s tuition fee. Many students use it as pocket money and became very happy. In fact, this money was subsidized by the Military Administration.

Yahya Khan began delivering Radio speeches like Ayub Khan. He introduced quarterly basis while Ayub adopted monthly basis. In the next Radio Broadcast on June 28, 1969 Yahya Khan declared to open political activities beginning January 1, 1970. He noted “one person one vote” for the upcoming election scheduling on October 5, 1970. Yahya asserted that the election would be for Parliamentary Democracy in the country. Again he asserted to go back to the barrack at the earliest.

Thus, each of the Radio addresses of Yahya Khan brought some aspiration to the people. Yahya added facilities to the students. One attractive feature was cut priced Cinema Hall ticket for viewing movies. Many students were very happy with this facility for the first time in Pakistan. Of curse, Yahya noted about the use of Institutional Identity Card to enjoy such facilities.

Another attractive feature using the same Identity Card was affirmed for the transportation fare within the city transit systems. This was actually an extension to the existing train or air fares for long range journey. Overall students got added facilities to enjoy such facilities. The private transport companies issued special fixed priced (concession) ticket which was subsidized by the Military Administration. The Cinema Hall authorities deducted the usual tax amount and kept the rest maintenance and entrance fees. Somehow the administration began losing tax money.

Yahya noted about the disparity between the two wings of Pakistan in the same broadcast on June 28, 1969. He partly blamed previous administration for causing disparity. Yahya assured that he would reduce disparity between the two wings as much as possible in a short period of time. As an immediate action item he declared to double the recruiting process in the Army. Similar action was recommended for the central (federal) jobs. Further, he declared ordering to capture corrupt officers or officials by taking account of personal properties on October 7, 1958 and on March 25, 1969. Obvious difference having inconsistency can give substantial evidence for corrupt practices in job. By October 1969 a list of 303 officers were published as they were all sacked from the job because of financially corrupt practices.

In the same broadcast Yahya dismantled one unit of Western Pakistan that Ayub envisioned with Basic Democracy in 1962. Thus, Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and Sarhad (North-West Frontier) came back in the map of Pakistan. Since these names appeared again in the map but the mystery remains with the name of the Eastern wing. Ayub installed two names for two wings of Pakistan which was pretty easy to note based on their location on the global map. Yahya remained silent about reviving Eastern Bengal for Eastern Pakistan as a province. This silence did not cause problem with the sentiment of the people of the then Eastern Pakistan concerning the name of the Province.

Overall, Yahya Khan became a popular figure to the students and common mass. He had no problem in walking nearly unguarded almost every corner of Pakistan. His actions were very generous and very practical though he had no public contact like Ayub Khan. It is mystery that both Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan never came to the contact of common people. They preferred to announce any thing from the palace and use Radio or TV. Their public lectures were very rare and made occasional with proper reason.

Almost immediately after coming to the office of the President, Yahya sent S. M. Ahsam (Vice Admiral) as Governor of the then Eastern Pakistan. Ahsan earned popularity very rapidly and began to enjoy often public contact. Thus, people were very happy besides seeing control of commodity pricing. Nevertheless, lifestyle became very healthy with firm economy. The fortune became glorious as the currency became very strong against the Indian currency as Pakistan did not devalue Rupee following devaluation of the British Sterling Pound. Thus, the new conversion rate became 11.43 instead of perennial 13.33 for each British Sterling Pound. But this happened in early 1970.

During September 28, 1969 Radio Broadcast Yahya affirmed about the election process. He defined the size of the Parliament with 300 elected Members having proper ratios for each Province of Pakistan. He asserted population basis seats in the Parliament including 13 reserved seats. In this way East Pakistan had 162 seats and West Pakistan had 138 seats with 7 female seats for East Pakistan and 6 female seats for West Pakistan.

Yhaya also announced the appointment of Justice Abdus Sattar as the Chief Election Commissioner. Later Sattar became elected President of Bangladesh on November 15, 1981. Yahya also asserted for the new constitutional map of Pakistan. Again, the scheduled date for election was affirmed by Yahya Khan. He assured full fledged political activities toward election campaign by political parties.

This time Yahya announced about the LFO and its purpose. He outlined the purpose and pointed toward each political party participating in the election to obey the content of LFO. He asked each party leader to sign it and follow the content therein to frame the constitution of Pakistan. Yahya clearly spelled out 120 days limit if the Parliament session once starts for framing the constitution. Yahya firmly asserted if the Parliament does not come to a conclusive decision on the constitution of the country within 120 days of seating inside the National Assembly then the entire Parliament automatically be declared as abrogated. This situation recalled for continued Military Administration until next decision for transfer of power is devised. Yahya mentioned this situation would be the worst scenario.

In order to reach a decision on framing the constitution Yahya mentioned about allowing sufficient time of discussion among the elected representatives (Parliament Members) outside the parliament. Yahya’s condition was clear on framing the constitution. The loop-hole that Yahya created was with the LFO. The meaning of LFO was understood by the political parties. It was made public at a later date on March 30, 1970 for comprehension. General mass never paid attention to this document as it had nothing to do with the daily life of a person within Pakistan. Since political activities were not allowed at that time, thus, there was no remark about LFO published by the political parties. Yahya’s outline of LFO was Greek until it was available as a document.

The LFO defines as how the political parties should behave during the election and following the election results. It also defined as how the Parliament would proceed with the constitution of Pakistan. Further LFO indicated as how the Prime Minister and the President would be determined for the country. Overall, it gave a mechanism of the ruling machinery.

Yahya Khan was not certain about the election result of the Eastern wing. Meanwhile Mujib began political activities with his massive public gathering in Dacca on the New Year’s Day. He was a hero during February-March 1969 after he was released from the Agartola Conspiracy Case on February 22, 1969. Tofael Ahmed orchestrated Mujib with a title BONGOBONDHU. Within days Mujib became a new personality while he was much unfamiliar in entire the then East Pakistan. This time Mujib became well known as his coverage in Radio, TV as well as newspapers became broad on a daily basis. He outnumbered many provincial leaders almost immediately with his increasing popularity.

Justice A. R. Cornelius, a Catholic Christian from Punjab, engineered the content of the LFO though he does not come to the forefront. He was bottle partner of Yahya Khan and served nicely under Ayub Khan as the Supreme Court Chief Justice. Both Yahya and Cornelius became friends to a level that Cornelius protected the interest of Yahya as the President of Pakistan. The LFO documented no overwhelming majority for a single Province by any political party. At least two Provinces were necessary exceeding 157 seats to make absolute majority in the Parliament out of 313 seats. In this way a single Province, like the then East Pakistan, cannot become the majority party in the Parliament if a single party captures all the 169 seats of East Pakistan. This is the tricky part of LFO which Mujib and his followers knew very well.

Further in the LFO national integrity, solidarity, and security of Pakistan were discussed. Every political party and their leaders must have solid faith in these items as part of the requirements. Every party must contribute to framing the constitution of Pakistan. By agreeing all the issues every political leader had to sign the document before competing in the election. In other words, these were the summary of the outlines of LFO. Kamal Hossain was Mujib’s advisor on the content of the LFO. Both Kamal and Mujib agreed to go for it to participate in the election.

The scheduled election date for October 5, 1970 was changed to a new date to December 7, 1970 sometime around August 15, 1970. Yahya came to see the flood situation in Dacca around August 12, 1970. First he went to the coastal areas and many other inundated parts of the then Eastern Pakistan. On August 13, 1970 he visited entire Dacca city from morning to sunset by driving an open Military Jeep putting on gumboot and regular Military uniform. He left the Presidential vehicle empty and driven by the driver only. The open Jeep was driven by Yahya with a single, presumably, bodyguard. This Jeep allowed him to go about 1-ft. deep water. Most of the time Yahya walked in the knee-deep or more-deep dirty water containing city waste from sewerage.

Knowing such ****** water Yahya walked all the camps primarily located in the local schools and temporary shelters. He distributed clothes, blankets, wheat, rice, and other ready-made food items. Yahya became a popular figure outright to the poor people. Every one chanted Yahya Zindabad. Days later a cross section of the same people chanted anti Yahya slogan when Mujib launched campaign meetings at various parts of Dacca city including other districts that were inundated with flood water. It was approximated that nearly 30,000 square miles area of the then East Pakistan was flooded in the 1970 flood. Mujib watched chanting slogans against Yahya this way by his party activists.

On August 15th 1970 Yahya returned to Islamabad and almost immediately he decided to shift the election date which was strongly suggested by many political parties including Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Mia Momtaj Daultana, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Khan Wali Khan, and many others from the then West Pakistan beside several East Pakistani political parties. The prime reason was flood in the then East Pakistan which needs time to recover from this natural disaster. Bhashani was against voting as he proclaimed VOTER AAGEY VAAT CHAAI (want food before election). Therefore, Bhashani suggested for complete abandonment of the election again by getting the chance of flooding.

It was Mujib who never recognized the problems of flooding in the then Eastern Pakistan. He wanted the election to be conducted by hook or by crook at the earliest possible time. Many interpreters seeing Mujib’s adamant attitude commented that Mujib may lose popularity as time runs out. This is because Mujib may become untrustworthy to the people if too long time is taken to conduct election. That is why Mujib was very restless and never acknowledge about flooding as a severe problem. He was the person who told flood is not an issue of changing the date for election but a great conspiracy is being hatched by other leaders of Pakistan who do not like his party to secure people’s mandate to get power in the center (Islamabad).

To note here Yahya was warned about the flooding early July 1970 by several political parties of the then East Pakistan. As October 5 1970 was nearing flood turned severe in the middle of August 1970. Flood water took another three weeks to subside until early September 1970. People began to go back to their home shortly thereafter. Many of them found no food at home, no job at all, damaged house, etc. It took time for them to settle down indeed.

There was another reason to choose December 7 1970 as the potential date for election as Yahya cited. He mentioned about the fasting month of Ramadan which began on November 02, 1970. Yahya did not favor voting during this holy month as most people will have shorter working days. Almost all political parties favored the justification except for Mujib. He expressed unhappiness and told Pakistani vested interest group is taking refuge of the religion. The again in order to enjoy hardcore Muslims’ votes he compromised that Pakistani vested interest group is anti-people elements. They do not understand people’s voting right and so on. All these explanations from Mujib had no ground considering logical reasons.

Shortly after this prolonged natural disaster, a terrible cyclone came in the coastal areas on the night of November 12, 1970. On that night Yahya was in China. He came back on November 14, 1970 at Dacca Airport to see the devastation as he was informed about it. Instead of taking a helicopter he briefly met Ahsan at the VIP room and took another aircraft to reach Islamabad. On the same night he reached Islamabad and the news media announced that Yahya was urgently called for events in the capital city which became priority.

In fact, Yahya was about to be toppled by Hamid Khan. He called Yahya to get certain things done for the interest of the Army which Yahya agreed to do. This situation saved Yahya from a possible overthrow. Of course, Chief of Staff Hamid Khan was sensible enough to wait on the disputed issue within the Army. No one knows exactly what the issue with Hamid Khan was. In the job Hamid Khan was senior to Yahya but Ayub made Yahya superseding several officers and made chief of staff. This is because Yahya Khan was one of the young officers who supported Ayub Khan’s arrival as the Military leader in 1958. That is why Yahya was promoted superseding others and he finally reached the peak in early 1966 when Musa retired. Since then Hamid remained second person to Yahya but Yahya had to digest Hamid’s ultimatum on several occasions after Ayub’s departure.

After recovering from possible overthrow Yahya returned to Dacca a week later on November 21, 1970. On the next day morning he began trips with a helicopter which he continued for two days. Shortly thereafter he returned to Islamabad. This time Yhaya decided to shift the election again as he recalled the death of two hundred thousand people. The actual figure could be ten times of this number. During Yahya’s departure Mujib cautioned as not to change the date of election.

Upon returning Islamabad Yahya changed the date for 9 constituencies along the coastal areas of the then East Pakistan after consulting with Justice Abdus Sattar. Somehow this opinion was tremendously disliked by Mujib on the evening of Ramadan Iftar for which he hardly did care. One way or the other Mujib never liked changing the election date at all. The reason is still unclear. None of his party activists gave any explanation for Mujib’s restlessness concerning the election process.

A week later after the Eid-ul-Fitr on Monday, December 7, 1970 election took place peacefully throughout Pakistan. Mujib won 151 seats out of 153 constituencies. After midnight Mujib gave a statement saying that conspiracy is still being hatched for not allowing going to the power. For what reason Mujib delivered such a statement no one knew but ordinary brain can feel that the Pakistanis are not going to allow Mujib to be in the throne. As a common citizen or even educated one, any one, from the then East Pakistan did not understand why Mujib apprehended conspiracy while the election was taking place nicely which paved the road for him. Thirty-six years later today only a few Bangladeshis possibly understand the loop hole why Mujib was not finally crowned as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Any way Mujib declared next day that all the elected Parliament Members will take oath on January 3, 1971 at the Outer Stadium. What was the purpose of this oath was a mystery.

Meanwhile December 17, 1970 came for the Provincial election. Mujib swept massive victory there except for the coastal 15 seats. On January 17, 1971 election took place in the coastal regions. Mujib secured all the seats for the National Parliament as well as for the Provincial Assembly. Thus, Mujib secured 160 seats which made him the winner of 167 seats that included 7 reserved seats for the females.

On January 3, 1970 Mujib staged a public oath ceremony at the Outer Stadium. He let doves fly in flocks of six and eleven referring to Mujib’s 6-point formula and student’s 11-point formula. On that day Mujib asserted firmly that CONSPIRACY continues for not allowing Mujib to go to the power. Again Mujib did not explain what the conspiracy was about. How the conspiracy came forward in Mujib’s mind remained a mystery.

On January 15, 1971 Yahya came to Dacca to talk to Mujib after setting the National Assembly Meeting date in Dacca on March 3, 1971. Before Meeting Mujib next day, Yahya firmly declared Mujib will be the next Prime Minister of Pakistan. Yahya was vowing to conclude his reign as President as the National Assembly Meeting date was advancing closer. That is why he, possibly, wanted a deal with Mujib as a continued President under the parliamentary system. Some sources indicate that Mujib was adamant not to consider a Military person as the figure head President of Pakistan. Eventually Yahya returned empty hand but arranged Bhutto to meet Mujib in order to advance discussion on framing the constitution. Yahya expressed anxiety as the winning parties were not discussing to frame a constitution for which Yahya expressed agony on many occasions by citing nine years for the first constitution implemented in 1956.

After winning a total of 88 seats from two provinces out of 144 seats Bhutto became very aggressive to grab power. He often cited the requirements of the LFO but got diffused with poor number of seats compared to Mujib’s party as a single hand. However, Bhutto gained momentum with the loop-hole of the LFO that framed by Yahya-Cornelius gang. Often Bhutto uttered very strong words as if he is the sole leader in the Parliament. At the outset of the election result Bhutto declared firmly that under any circumstance he would not consider OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP in the Parliament.

Invariably he felt strongly that he is the qualified Prime Minister of Pakistan per LFO. Bhutto indicated, if necessary, Mujib can become opposition leader in the Parliament. Further. Bhutto uttered under any circumstance he would not compromise any shortfall for the Prime Minister position and shall never share power with Mujib. On the other hand Mujib was adamant for not sharing power and never felt that he is not the majority party leader in the parliament. Again Mujib kept reiterating, after Yahya’s departure on 17 January 1971, that conspiracy is continuing all over Pakistan to oppose his assuming power from Yahya Khan. Meanwhile Yahya shut his mouth about Mujib’s future in the power transfer process as he was frustrated for not getting assurance of his continued pay-check.

Bhutto came to Dacca on January 29, 1971 to meet Mujib with his group of associates. Mujib arranged a great get-together in a rented LAUNCH that took nearly 300 people in SHAT-NOL area not too far from Jagadish Chandra Bose’s house on the morning of January 30, 1971. They landed in the Shat-nol alley (short-cut passage to go to parts of Faridpur from Dacca) where delicious cooking took place using professional cook for making each item. All the persons on board had a nice SOFOR on the land seeing country side and digesting fresh air while cooking continued. Among the items Polau, Kachchi Biriyani, Kofta, Shik-Kabab, Tikia Kabab, Rezala, Borhani, Salad, and many other delicious items were included in the menu. They finished the lunch with marvelous sweets as delicacy of the Bengali heritage style in the early afternoon. The snack contained tea and other soft drinks. Bhutto enjoyed this trip with his associates.

However, there was no discussion concerning as how they could frame the constitution of Pakistan. Two leaders had no hard exchange as they passed time with fun PICNIC or NOU-BIHAR. They reached the starting point Sadarghat terminal in the late afternoon just before the sunset.

On the day of picnic an Indian Airlines was skyjacked by some fellows from Kashmir and brought to Lahore Airport in the mod-morning. Later on the same day afternoon the hijackers blew it. India blamed Pakistan for destroying the aircraft. Further India wanted the hijackers back on the Indian soil. Pakistan denied doing so. As a result by late afternoon India banned flights of the Pakistani aircrafts over Indian Territory. Pakistan accepted that as a reality and resumed flights between the wings roaming nearly double the distance between Dacca and Karachi.

Concerning Pakistani policy against India or vice versa, Mujib was mum. Bhutto gave statements against India. Later Mujib affirmed that the act of hijacking and blowing up the aircraft was incorrect. Next day morning Aakash Bani declared that Mujib is vowing power share with Bhutto in Dacca which Mujib denied. Bhutto did not say anything but returned to Karachi with his team. Upon reaching home Bhutto threatened all the elected Parliament members to break legs if anyone prepares to go to Dacca for the upcoming National Assembly Meeting scheduled on March 3, 1971. Bhutto openly declared his ambition to grab power by hook or by crook. He also said under any circumstance he would not allow Mujib to come closer to the power circle.

Frustrated Mujib continued his agenda with CONSPIRACY theory without making any conclusive remark. It was practically difficult to understand what exactly Mujib was trying to convey in his public meetings as well as declaration to the journalists. One thing was very clear that the utterances of Mujib and Bhutto had no similarity. It was very clear that Bhutto was getting strength from some corner. Actually that corner was nothing but LFO. The same LFO became CONSPIRACY to Mujib which Mujib did not make public.

In the eyes of common people Yahya seemed to begin working with Bhutto so that he gets a steady pay-check. Perhaps Bhutto had consented that way as no evidence suggests this undeclared plan. In the meantime Bhutto informed Yahya in Larkana during the first week of February 1971 that he had no discussion with Mujib during his meeting in Shat-nol concerning framing constitution and the process of power transfer. Yahya began to frustrate over Mujib’s overall conduct. Yahya tried to make clear to Mujib that under any circumstance Mujib had to follow LFO. This became very strong assertion when Yahya did not get assurance after the days of power transfer for himself.

On February 15, 1971 Yahya dissolved his advisory cabinet (Ministerial cabinet like) and vowed to transfer power on March 3, 1971 in Dacca. This was a false indication from Yahya as he already got indication from Bhutto about his continued pay-check. Yahya began to buy time and kept Mujib under observation. On March 1, 1971 Yahya postponed the National Assembly Meeting schedule to be held in Dacca on March 3, 1971. It was announced over Radio Broadcast in the 1:00 p.m. news. The reaction started with fire in the Dacca Stadium where cricket Match was going on with Pakistan and Commonwealth XI. The players were sent to the security in the pavilion and quickly transported to Hotel Intercontinental. In the next flight all of them left for Karachi on the same evening. The rest of the day was chaotic with heavy unrest all over Dacca. The traffic became irregular as a few private cars and public buses were gutted in the Gulistan-Jinnah Avenue areas.

On February 15, 1971 Radio Australia announced that two packed ships were on the way to reach Chittagong port. This piece of news coincided with Yahya’s abandoning advisory council. It is a puzzle as how Radio Australia got this information remained as untold mystery even now. It is a surprise that Mujib’s followers or advisors never kept any information concerning the movement of the Pakistani Army.

Equating all pieces together there is no indication for Mujib-Bhutto discussion toward framing the constitution. Also it may be concluded that no discussion with Bhutto was necessary for Yahya to decide what to do as a next step. Nevertheless, Mujib frustrated on January 16, 1971 Meeting in Dacca when Yahya was turned down for a continued job. Seeing and evaluating all sequential features it appears that Mujib was a blunt and fool to understand the dynamics of politics though he seemed to be a political player for a long time. Knowing personal weakness concerning signing the LFO, and comprehending the loop-hole of the LFO Mujib should have compromised if he truly believed in the integrity of Pakistan. If Mujib did not believe in the integrity of Pakistan then he should have taken realistic plan and subsequent program for timely armed cessation so that his popularity does not reduce on one hand. On another hand, Mujib should have ensured outright recognition from friendly countries, whatever it could be, so that the loss of the lives and property would have been negligible. In general, the leaders of any revolution act in this way without surrendering.

Over Radio the reason cited as more time required to have dialogue between Mujib and Bhutto to come to a unified conclusion about the constitution of Pakistan. This argument was not sold to Mujib at any price as Mujib blamed Bhutto and Yahya for conducting joint conspiracy. This is the beginning of CONSPIRACY issue as a new episode with more explanation from Mujib. Immediately Mujib explained that he knew such incident would happen and reiterated that he always cautioned about the CONSPIRACY from the very beginning of the election results. Thus, Mujib began self-justification to earn more extra credit on his “conspiring theory” for the transfer of power to the elected representatives. Mujib continued blaming Bhutto and Yahya as a gang player. Indeed the common mass of the then East Pakistan viewed the entire sequential incident as the CONSPIRING THEORY of Mujib. With this beginning of the chaos Mujib became successful with his hypothesis.

The chaos shortly turned to the new flag in our planet. Mujib never apprehended this to happen and often expressed unhappiness to the students entering his residence. These students hoisted flag of unborn Bangladesh on March 2, 1971. They asked Mujib to declare independence of Bangladesh. Meanwhile Mujib and his followers used BANGLA, BANGLADESH, and many other conjugations with BENGALI associated words in several public meetings apart from using JOI BANGLA.

Mujib had no obvious plan for declaring independence on March 2, 1971. Rather he chose to become a leader of the Radar-less mass. His followers already changed the radio station to Dacca Betar Kendro (Radio Center). A new dimensional program was installed to the Radio as well as to the TV. The entire Eastern Province of Pakistan began a new phase of life with the taste of semi-independence though enjoyed a sort of independence since 1947. No one was certain exactly what the taste of this independence would be. However, black flag became a co-flag with the new flag of Bangladesh almost every building top in the city of Dacca. The University of Dacca became a center for controlling new directives for the embryo-stage nation.

Mujib’s followers began to issue directives since March 2, 1971 using the pattern of Martial Promulgation Ordinance with sequential numbers. These directives gradually became furious as time went on. Public life became insecure where value of human life and property became vulnerable. Nearly overnight night-watchmen were imported from Mujib’s party in various areas of Dacca city. Loot, arson, rape, killing, etc. became a broad day light feature throughout unborn Bangladesh. On March 2nd, 1971 Mujib set for a public Meeting in Ramna Race Course Maidan on March 7th 1971. Mujib arranged broadcasting his lecture over Radio. But this did not happen as the Pakistani Military authority interfered to stop it. In that meeting Mujib gave four conditions that gave no alternate to the immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives.

The power transfer job was not that easy as Mujib uttered easily after March 1, 1971. The clumsy process of LFO was not easy to square away other than making some hotchpotch cabinet to rule the country. This was unacceptable to both Mujib and Bhutto as Mujib felt he was the sole majority party leader but could not assert on it because of LFO, and as Bhutto felt he was the majority party leader per LFO requirements though does not have the absolute majority in terms of number. The LFO became a true barrier for the transfer of power unless some extraordinary manipulation is done. Because of this potential manipulation which Yahya could handle single-handedly, Yahya approached Mujib for some assurance of continued office work. Poor Mujib did not understand the language and stood by the civilian architecture of his administration.

Refusing to use bullets on the mass of the then East Pakistan Ahsan left his position from the Governor’s house. Quickly the position was given to Tikka Khan and he arrived on March 6, 1971. At the same time, Shahebzada Yakub Khan, another popular General, left the office of the zonal Martial Law office. This position was filled with Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi at a later date. Both Tikka and Niazi came almost at the same time to fill the gaps. Tikka was refused to get sworn in as Governor on March 7th 1971 by Justice B. A. Siddiky and his staff.

After Yahya’s 6th March 1971 Radio Broadcast series of ships began to arrive in Chittagong port filled with Arms and Army Personnel. The arms were cleared with the help of the Bengali speaking employees using them as labors. These ships continued coming at least until March 25, 1971 without interruption. Often exchanges of firing took place due to unhappiness of the common people. Such events continued various parts of unborn Bangladesh.

Meanwhile March 6th 1971 came when Yahya voiced to meet Mujib on 15th March 1971 in Dacca. He assured to meet the National Assembly in Dacca on March 25, 1971. Mujib became very angry with the process that Yahya adopted. He blamed Yahya for not consulting him to make decisions on choosing the dates either for postponing or for rescheduling the National Assembly Meeting. Mujib pretended not to understand that Yahya apparently did not consult anyone to schedule these dates. It was mere presumptions by Mujib.

Finally, Yahya came to Dacca on March 15th 1971 at an unscheduled time in the mid afternoon where Tikka Khan received him at the Dacca Airport. On the next morning Mujib and Yahya met without aide. They discussed various issues for at least two hours. Mujib was let go without lunch for that day. He came out of the President’s House (later Gonovaban) and told present journalists that talks were very fruitful.

The next day, Mujib sat down with five advisors while Yahya was primarily assisted with Peerzada, a diehard discriminator. After a long time Meeting with Yahya, Mujib came out of the room and declared talks are advancing toward power transfer. He also asserted that Yahya was agreeing all issues that Mujib wanted in the constitution. Meanwhile Yahya announced on March 17th 1971 that the National Assembly Meeting scheduled on March 25, 1971 is canceled and will be rescheduled after discussing with Mujib.

It is very irony that Mujib never told truth to the people at all. Each day Mujib met Yahya, and Yahya repeated the content of LFO to Mujib implying MJUIB WAS THE PROVINCIAL MAJORITY LEADER. Therefore, Mujib will have to accept the outcome of the LFO. Morally Mujib agreed each day this warning from Yahya but remained silent tom the public. Yahya never felt any problem with the LFO as it was not his matter at all. Yahya was only a fabricator while Mujib and other political leaders were just law abiding followers of the same document.

Bhutto and a few of his party members came to participate in the discussion with Yahya and Mujib. In fact this should have been done perhaps in early January 1971 instead of at this moment. Bhutto practically remained ineffective as if he knew what the consequence would be very soon.

Mujib continued bluff to the people until the late afternoon of March 25, 1971. It is really a concern that on that day Mujib also told the journalists that Yahya was finalizing transfer of power to the people elected representatives very soon. That time never came but realized with bullets within hours. The people of the soil began to absorb bullets after bullets which came without warning.

In the late afternoon on March 25, 1971 all party leaders headed by Wali Khan with Asghar Khan, Qaiyum Khan, Momtaj Daultana, and other party leaders of the then West Pakistan met Mujib to convince him from his adamant attitude of transferring power to the elected representatives at once. This never came as a fact from the mouth of Mujib but reveled in the utterances of Yahya Khan and then again in the White Paper published in October 1971.

The rest is the history as alive as if floating in the eyes of the people those who experienced the liberation war. Soon a new country emerged as Bangladesh on the global map. In fact, Mujib’s hiding of the LFO signed document from the public has caused harm but eventually people realized to retaliate with arms to liberate the land without knowing about the LFO. The LFO is a mystery even today among the Bangladeshis, older or younger. No one knew about the consequence of LFO although Mujib and his close associate knew about it.

Today Kamal Hossain is alive. He knew about LFO. It was his recommendation to Mujib to sign this document and never talk about it to the public arena. Kamal Hossain possibly advised Mujib to go for voting and assured to make a deal about it at a later date. But Mujib was adamant Mujib about capturing the throne of Pakistan without a degree of compromise. His mind did not thaw from frozen mind-set with the Army Personnel as the “constitutional President of Pakistan” having a civilian Government headed by Mujib. While Yahya was in the steering holding the gear perfectly and Mujib seating in the driver’s seat should have compromised to get the throne which he craved for a long time if truly Mujib wanted integrated Pakistan per requirements of LFO. Yahya’s indication for transfer of power, though seemed very sincere from day one, but became very confusing only after January 16th 1971 Meeting with Mujib in Dacca. All actions after this time seemed very erratic from Yahya’s corner and always gave a flavor that Yahya was engaged in a conspiracy of killing people instead of framing a genuine constitution of Pakistan.

Yahya could sit down with both Mujib and Bhutto together to clear out confusion about the LFO if he was so genuine to his promise. Also Yahya could assert publicly the consequence of LFO as Mujib was not talking about it in public. Yahya knew very well that Mujib was bluffing to the people but remained silent to look ahead with the consequence of bullets. His cruelty was eventually punished by his humiliated departure from the office on December 20, 1971. Personal interest became very prominent and important for Yahya which eventually brought brutal sentiment in Yahya’s mind that prompted him to send Arms and Personnel to Chittagong on February 15, 1971. Had Yahya been a slight intelligent then he could have saved his favorite Pakistan simply by handing over power to Mujib by ignoring Bhutto. Rather he sided with Bhutto and saved him to see him as his successor but never realized humiliation.

Unplanned liberation war was never been successful if Pakistan had been a continuous land. Thus, Mujib should have been little more careful if he had decided for Bangladesh. Mujib could have earned independence on March 1, 1971 with minimal loss of life if he had vision and honesty. His bluffing nature never made him a man of character as well as a statesman. He continued telling lies that his grave was dug next to the cell in Pakistan even after coming back from the Pakistani custody. This blunt lie had no room to accommodate if any one becomes critical reviewer of Mujib’s chronological political career.

Another issue concerning a Meeting with Bhutto before Mujib’s departure from Islamabad Airport for London on January 8, 1972 is a mystery. Many analyzers predict that Mujib assured Bhutto with promises but later became null and void because of Indian influence in his administration. Further, Mujib was believed to have received a copy of the Holy Quo’ran from Bhutto which was never mentioned by Mujib at all.

Whatever Altaf Gauhar has documented about Mujib never coincided with what Mujib uttered about his cell life which was usually an ultra-brief note. Mujib’s screaming in the next cell of Altaf Gauhar contained aspiration of an integrated Pakistan, if released. Mujib used to utter he could make Pakistan united. He wanted to meet Yahya repeatedly. Unfortunately Altaf Gauhar was still in custody though Mujib enjoyed power sitting in the office of anew country. Thus, no one knew what Altaf had to say about Mujib until later date when Mujib was no more.

It is very difficult to extract truth of the liberation war and all the events as why happened. This is because most of them are now dead. There are many fake associates of Mujib who were simply in touch with Mujib but knew nothing about the liberation war. Today Kamal Hossain is the only chap who has all the information. He must be arrested and quizzed to extract correct history of the liberation war of Bangladesh. After Kamal Hossain there would be no one to get truth about the incidents of 1970-1972 politics of our country. Before time runs out it is better to extract information as much as the nation could to erect a sound history and the role of Mujib during the liberation war of Bangladesh. Any sensible nation would do so in the greater interest of the generations to come. How long Kamal Hossain would remain silent? He is not going to be punished for revealing the truth which will aid to form a new dimension of the history of Bangladesh.

– Mohammad Abdullah, USA

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LEGAL FRAMEWORK ORDER 1970
The Legal Framework Order was issued as President’s Order No. 2 of 1970 by the President
and Chief Martial Administrator, General A. M. Yahya Khan on March 30, 1970 in
Rawalpindi. Although the Order mainly dealt with election procedures, it can still be counted as a constitutional landmark because it was in this order that the principle of adult franchise was reintroduced to promote direct election of legislature and executive.

Also, the Order provided some basic principles for the future constitution of the country. WHEREAS in his first address to the nation on the 26th March, 1969, the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator pledged himself to strive to restore democratic institutions in the country;AND WHEREAS in his address to the nation on the 28th November, 1969, he reaffirmed that pledge and announced that polling for a general election to a National Assembly of Pakistan will commence on the 5th October, 1970;
AND WHEREAS he has since decided that polling for elections to the Provincial Assemblies
shall commence not later than the 22nd October, 1970; AND WHEREAS provision has already been made by the Electoral Rolls Order, 1969, for the preparation of electoral rolls for the purpose of election of representatives of the people on the basis of adult franchise
AND WHEREAS it is necessary to provide for the constitution of a National Assembly of
Pakistan for the purpose of making provision as to the Constitution of Pakistan in accordance with this Order and a Provincial Assembly for each Province; NOW, THEREFORE, in pursuance of the Proclamation of the 25th day of March, 1969, and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf, the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator is pleased to make the following order:

Short Title
Article 1
(1) This Order may be called the Legal Framework Order, 1970.
(2) It shall come into force on such date as the President may, by notification in the officialGazette, appoint in this behalf.

To override other laws

Article 2
This order shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the
Provisional Constitution Order, the Constitution of 1962 of the Islamic Republic of Pakistanor any other law for the time being in force.

Definitions

Article 3
(1) In this order unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.
(i) “Assembly” means the National Assembly of Pakistan or a Provincial Assembly for a
Province provided for in this Order;
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(ii) “Commission” means the Election Commission constituted under Article;
(lit) “Commissioner” means the Chief Election Commissioner appointed or deemed to be
appointed under the Electoral Rolls Older, 1969 (P. 0. No. 6 of 1969);
(iv) “electoral roll” means the electoral roll prepared under the Electoral Rolls Order, 1969,(P.O. No. 6 of 1969);

(v) “member” means member of an Assembly.
(vi) “Speaker” means the Speaker of the National Assembly; and
(vii) “Centrally Administered Tribal Areas” has the same meaning as in the Province of WestPakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970.

(2) In relation to the territories included at the commencement of this Order in the Province of West Pakistan, references to a Province and a Provincial Assembly shall be construed as references respectively to a new Province provided for in the Province of West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970, and the Provincial Assembly for such Province.
Composition of National AssemblyArticle 4
(1) There shall be a National Assembly of Pakistan consisting of three hundred and thirteen members of -whom three hundred shall be elected to fill general seats and thirteen to fill seats reserved for women.

(2) In conformity with the population figures appearing in the Census of 1961, the number of seats in National Assembly shall be distributed amongst the Provinces and the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas, as set out in Schedule I.

(3) Clause (1) shall not be construed as preventing a woman from being elected to a general seat.

Provincial Assemblies
Article 5
(1) There shall be a Provincial Assembly for each Province consisting of the number of
members elected to fill general seats and to fill seats reserved for women, as set out in
Schedule II in relation to such Province.

(2) Clause (1) shall not be construed as preventing a woman from being elected to a general seat.

Principle of election
Article 6

(1) Except as provided in clause (2), the members shall be elected to the general seats from territorial constituencies by direct election on the basis of adult franchise in accordance with law.

(2) The President may, by regulation, make separate provision for election of members from the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas.

(3) As soon as practicable after the general election of members of the National Assembly, the members from a Province for the seats reserved for women in that Assembly shall be elected by persons elected to the general seats from that Province in accordance with law.
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(4) The members for scats reserved for women in a Provincial Assembly shall be elected by
persons elected to the general seats in that Assembly in accordance with law.
Casual vacancy Article 7

Where a seat in the National Assembly has become vacant, an election to fill the vacancy
shall be held within three weeks from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Election Commission

Article 8
For the purposes of election of the members of an Assembly and matters connected
therewith, the President shall constitute an Election Commission consisting of the following members namely:(a) the Commissioner, who shall be the Chairman of the Commission;and (b) two other members, each being a person who is a permanent Judge of a High Court.

Qualifications and disqualifications.

Article 9
(1) A person shall, subject to the provisions of Clause (2), be qualified to be elected as, and to be, a member if-

(a) he is citizen of Pakistan;
(b) he has attained the age of twenty-five years;and
© his name appears on the electoral roll for any constituency in the Province or Centrally

Administered Tribal Areas from which he seeks election.
(2) A person shall be disqualified from beings-elected as, and from being, a member if-
(a) he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court;or
(b) he is an undischarged insolvent unless a period of ten years has elapsed since his being

adjudged as insolvent;or

© he has been, on conviction for any offence, sentenced to transportation for any term or to imprisonment for a term of not less than two years, unless a period of five years, or such less period as the President may allow in any particular case, has elapsed since his release;or (d) he has been a member of the President’s Council of Ministers at any time following the 1st August, 1969 unless a period of two years or such less period as the President may allow in any particular case, has elapsed since he ceased to be a Minister;or (e) he holds office in the service of Pakistan other than an office which if not a wholetime office remunerated either by salary or by fee;or

(f) he has been dismissed for misconduct from the service of Pakistan, unless a period of five years, or such less period as the President may allow in any particular case, has elapsed sincehis dismissal;or
(g) such person is the spouse of a person in the service of Pakistan;or
(h) he, whether by himself or by any person or body of persons in trust for him or for his benefit or on his account or as a member of a Hindu undivided family, has any share or interest in a contract not being a contract between a co-operative society and Government, for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any contract or the performance of any services undertaken by Government:

Provided that the disqualification under sub-clause, (h) shall not apply to a person –
(i) where the share or interest in the contract devolves on him by inheritance or succession oras a legatee, executor or administrator, until the expiration of six months after it has so devolved on him or such longer period as the President may, in any particular case, allow; or (ii) where the contract has been entered into by or ‘ on behalf of a public company as defined in the Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913), of which he is a share-holder but is neither a director holding an office of profit under the company nor a managing agent;or (iii) where he is a member of a Hindu undivided family and the contract has been entered into by any other member of that family in the course of carrying on a separate business in which he has no share or interest.

(3) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that a Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court, the Comptroller and Auditor General of Pakistan, the Attorney General of
Pakistan and an Advocate General of a Province are persons holding offices in the service of Pakistan.

(4) If any question arises whether a member has after his election, become subject to any
disqualification the Commissioner shall place the question before the Election Commission
and, if the opinion of the Commission be that the member has become so subject, his seat
shall become vacant.

Bar against candidature
Article 10
(1) No person shall at the same time be a member of more than one Assembly or a member of
the same Assembly for more than one constituency.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall prevent a person from being at the same time a candidate for election from | two or more constituencies, but if a person has been elected as a member for two or more constituencies and does not within fifteen days of the notification of his election by the constituency by which he has been elected last, make a declaration in writing under his hand addressed to the Commissioner specifying the constituency which he wishes to represent, all his seats shall become vacant, but so long as he is a member for two or more constituencies he shall not sit or vote in an Assembly.

Resignation
Article 11
(1) A member may resign his seat by notice in writing under his hand addressed to the
Speaker.

(2) If a member is absent from the Assembly without leave of the Speaker for fifteen
consecutive sitting days, his seat shall become vacant.

(3) If a member fails to take and subscribe an oath in accordance with Article 12 within a
period of seven days from the date of the first meeting of the Assembly after | his election, his

seat shall become vacant :
5
Provided that the Speaker or, if the Speaker has not been elected, the Commissioner, may,
before the expiration of the said period, for good cause shown, extend the period.

Article 12

A person elected as a member of an Assembly shall, before entering upon the office, take and subscribe, before a person presiding at a meeting of the Assembly, an oath or affirmation in the following form, namely :-

“I… do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and that I will discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter honestly, to the best of my ability, faithfully in accordance with the provisions of the Legal Framework Order, 1970, the law and rules of the Assembly set out in that Order, and always in the interest of the solidarity, integrity, well-being and prosperity of Pakistan.”

Date of polling

Article 13
Polling for election to the National Assembly shall commence on the 5th October, 1970 and
polling for election to the Provincial Assemblies shall commence on a date not later than the 22nd October, 1970.

Summoning of Assembly

Article 14
(i) After the close of the general election of members of the National Assembly, the President shall, for the purpose of framing a Constitution for Pakistan, summon the National Assembly to meet on such day and at such time and place as he may think fit;and the National

Assembly so summoned shall stand constituted on the day of its first meeting:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall be construed as preventing the President from
summoning the National Assembly on the ground that all the seats of the members have not
been filled.

(2) After meeting as convened under clause (1), the National Assembly shall meet at such
times and places as the Speaker may decide.

(3) The National Assembly shall, subject to reasonable adjournments, meet from day to day
to transact its business.

Article 15

The President may address the National Assembly and send a message or messages to the
Assembly.

6

Speaker and Deputy Speaker
Article 16
(1) The National Assembly shall, as soon as may be, elect two of its members to be
respectively the Speaker and Deputy Speaker thereof and shall, so often as the office of
Speaker or Deputy Speaker becomes vacant, elect another member to be the Speaker, or, as
the case may be. Deputy Speaker.

(2) Until the Speaker and Deputy Speaker are elected, the Commissioner shall preside at the
meetings of the National Assembly and perform the functions of Speaker.
(3) Where the office of the Speaker is vacant, the Deputy Speaker, or, if the office of the

Deputy Speaker is also vacant, the Commissioner, shall perform the functions of Speaker.

(4) During the absence of the Speaker from any meeting of the National Assembly, the
Deputy Speaker or if the Deputy Speaker is also absent, such member, as may be determined
by the rules of procedure of the Assembly, shall perform the functions of Speaker.

(5) A member holding office as Speaker or Deputy Speaker shall cease to hold that office-
(a) if he ceases to be a member of the National Assembly;

(b) if he resigns his office by writing under his hand addressed to the President;or
© if a resolution expressing want of confidence in him is moved in the Assembly after notless than fourteen days’ notice of the intention to move it and passed by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of the National Assembly.
Quorum and Rules of Procedure

Article 17

(1) If, at any time during a meeting of the National Assembly, the attention of the personpresiding at the meeting is drawn to the fact that the number of persons present is less thanone hundred, the person presiding shall either suspend the meeting until the number of members present is not less than one hundred or adjourn the meeting.

(2) The procedure of the National Assembly shall be regulated by the rules of procedure set out in Schedule III; in particular the National Assembly shall decide how a decision relating to the Constitution Bill is to be taken.

(3) The National Assembly may act notwithstanding any vacancy in the seat of a member and
no proceedings in the Assembly shall be invalid by reason that some members whose election is subsequently held to have been void or who, after election had incurred a disqualification for membership voted or otherwise took part in the proceedings.

Privileges, etc
Article 18

(1) The validity of any proceeding? in the National Assembly shall not be called in question
in any court.

(2) A member or a person entitled to speak in the National Assembly shall not be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in the Assembly or in any committee thereof.

7
(3) The exercise by an officer of the National Assembly of the powers vested in him for the regulation of procedure, the conduct of business or the maintenance of order, in or in relation to any proceeding in the Assembly shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of any court.

(4) A person shall not be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of the publication by, or under the authority of the National Assembly of any report, paper, vote or proceedings.

(5) No process issued by a court or other authority shall, except with the leave of the Speaker,be served or executed within the precincts of the place where a meeting of the National Assembly or of any Committee thereof is being held.

Allowances of members

Article 19
The Speaker, the Deputy Speaker and the other members shall be entitled to such allowances and privileges as the President may, by order, prescribe.

Fundamental Principles of the Constitution
Article 20
The Constitution shall be so framed as to embody the following fundamental principles:-
(1) Pakistan shall be a federal republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in which the provinces and other territories which are now and may hereinafter be included in Pakistan shall be so united in a federation that the independence, the territorial integrity and the national solidarity of Pakistan are ensured and that the unity of the federation in not in any manner impaired.

(2) (a) Islamic ideology which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan shall be preserved;and (b) the Head of the State shall be a Muslim.

(3) (a) Adherence to fundamental principles of democracy shall be ensured by providing-
direct and free periodical elections to the federal and the provincial legislatures on the basis of population and adult franchise;(b) the Fundamental Rights of the citizens shall be laid down and guaranteed;© the independence of the judiciary in the matter of dispensation of justice and enforcement of the fundamental rights shall be secured.

(4) All powers including legislative, administrative and financial, shall be so distributed between the Federal Government and the Provinces that the Provinces shall have maximum autonomy, that is to say maximum legislative, administrative and financial powers but the Federal Government shall also have adequate powers including legislative, administrative and financial powers, to discharge its responsibilities in relation to external and internal affairs and to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the country.

(5) It shall be ensured that-
(a) the people of all areas in Pakistan shall be enabled to participate fully in all forms of
national activities;and
(b) within a specified period, economic and all other disparities between the Provinces and between different areas in a Province are removed by the adoption of statutory and other measures.

Preamble of the Constitution
Article 21
The Constitution shall contain, in its preamble, an affirmation that-
(1) the Muslims of Pakistan shall be enabled, individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah; and (2) the minorities shall be enabled to profess and practise their religions freely and to enjoy all rights, privileges and protection due to them as citizens of Pakistan.

Directive Principles
Article 22
The Constitution shall set out directive principles of State Policy by which the State shall beguided in the matter of-

(1) promoting Islamic way of life;

(2) observance of Islamic moral standards;

(3) providing facilities for the teaching of Holy Quran and Islamiat to the Muslims of
Pakistan;and

(4) enjoining that no law repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out inthe Holy Quran and Sunnah, is made.

Assemblies to be first legislatures
Article 23
The Constitution shall provide that-
(1) the National Assembly, constituted under this Order, shall-
(a) be the first legislature of the Federation for the full term if the legislature of the Federation consists of one House, and (b) be the first Lower House of the legislature of the Federation for the full term if thelegislature of the Federation consists of two Houses.

(2) The Provincial Assemblies elected in accordance with this Order shall be the first
legislatures of the respective Provinces for the full term.Time for framing Constitution

Article 24
The National Assembly shall frame the Constitution in the form of a Bill to be called the
Constitution Bill within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the date of its firstmeeting and on its failure to do so shall stand dissolved.

Authentication

Article 25
The Constitution Bill, as passed by the National Assembly, shall be presented to the President
for authentication. The National Assembly shall stand dissolved in the event that
authentication is refused.9

Article 26
(1) Save as provided in this Order for the purpose of framing a constitution for Pakistan, the National Assembly shall not meet in that capacity, until the Constitution Bill passed by thatAssembly and authenticated by the President, has come into force.
(2) A Provincial Assembly shall not be summoned to meet until after the Constitution Bill
passed by the National Assembly has been authenticated by the President, and has come intoforce.

Interpretation of Order etc

Article 27
(1) Any question or doubt as to the interpretation of any provision of this Order shall be resolved by a decision of the President, and such decision shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any Court.(2) The President and not the National Assembly shall have the power to make any
amendment in this Order.

Reaction to LFO

In the then East Pakistan the LFO received a mixed response. While the parties with mass
following such as Awami League, and both factions of National Awami Party led Abdul
Hamid Khan Bhashani and Muzaffar Ahmed. Given that Awami League had the biggest mass
following Sheikh Mujib wanted to play his cards as sated by Siddiq Salik:
It was the first anniversary of the second martial law in Pakistan. Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman was on his way to a rural town in East Pakistan to address an election rally.

On the back seat of his rattling car sat with him a non-Bengali journalist who covered
his election tours. He provoked Mujib on some current topic and quietly switched on his
cassette tape recorder. Later he entertained his friends with his exclusive possession.

He also played it to me. Mujib’s rhetorical voice was clearly intelligible. He was saying:‘Somehow, Ayub Khan has pitched me to a height of popularity where nobody can so
“no” to what I want. Even Yahya Khan cannot refuse my demands’.

What were his demands? A clue was provided another tape prepared by Yahya Khan’s
intelligence agencies.

The subject was the Legal Framework Order (LFO) issued by the Government on 30 March 1970. Practically it was an outline of constitution which denied a free hand to Mujib to implement his famous Six Points. He confined his views on LFO to his senior colleagues without realizing that these words are being taped for Yahya’s consumption. On the recording, Mujib said: ‘My aim is to establish Bangla Desh. I shall LFO into pieces as soon as the elections are over.

Who could challenge me once the elections are over?’ When it was played to Yahya Khan, he said, ‘I will fix him if he betrays me’. (Siddiq Salik, Witness to Surrender, Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1997, p.1 and G.W. Chowdhury , Last Days of United Pakistan, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1974, p.98).

Fwd By Dr Mohammad Alauddin
Senior Lecturer in Economics
School of Economics
The University of Queensland

Credit: AK Zaman

Genocide in East Pakistan

Saturday Review May 22, 1971; p. 20-21

The most fundamental of all rights the right of a man to come to the aid of a fellow human being is now being denied with a degree of official arrogance seldom displayed in recent history.

The people of East Pakistan, who are still suffering from homelessness and hunger caused by the tidal waves of less than a year ago, are now caught up in a man-made disaster. Their land has become a locked-in arena of authorized slaughter. Communications with the outside world have been reduced almost to the vanishing point. Those who have offered emergency medical aid or other help have been told to stay out.

The present situation has its remote origins in the division of the Indian subcontinent into two nations in 1947. The movement for independence from Great Britain had been complicated and imperiled by the existence of Hindu and Moslem blocs. Great Britain had fostered the concept of a partitioned subcontinent in which India would be predominantly Hindu and Pakistan would be predominantly Moslem. For a long time, Gandhi and Nehru had opposed partition, believing it imperative fat both religious orders to be accommodated within a single large national design. Gandhi and Nehru withdrew their opposition to partition, however, when it appeared certain that national independence might otherwise be indefinitely delayed.

The design for partition called for two nations. Actually, three nations emerged. For Pakistan was partitioned within itself, into East and West. The Western part was larger geographically and became the capital. The Eastern part was more populous and richer in resources. The units lay more than 1,000 miles apart.

In order to comprehend the geographical anomaly this physical separation represented, one has only to imagine what would have happened if Maine and Georgia had decided to form a separate nation, Maorgia, with practically the whole of the United States lying in between. Let us further suppose that the capital of the new nation would have been Augusta, Northern Maorgia, while most of the people and resources would have been in Southern Maorgia. The result would have been an administrative, political, and economic shambles. What has happened in Pakistan roughly fits that description. Further compounding the situation are the severe cultural and historic differences between Punjabi (West) and Bengali (East) societies.

For a time, the peoples of East and West Pakistan were held together by the spiritual and political exhilaration of a new nationalism. But the underlying difficulties grew more pronounced and visible year by year. The people of East Pakistan chafed under what they felt was West Pakistan’s latter-day version of British colonialism. They claimed they were not being represented in proportion to their numbers in either high posts or policies of government. They charged they were being exploited economically, furnishing labor and resources without sharing fairly in the profits from production. They pointed to the sharp disparity in wages and living conditions between East and West.

It was inevitable that the disaffection should reach an eruptive stage. There is no point here in detailing the facts attending the emergence of political movements seeking self-rule for East Pakistan. All that need be said that the central government at Islamabad finally did agree to submit self-rule propositions to the East Pakistan electorate. The result of the general election was an overwhelming vote in favor of self-rule. The central government at Islamabad not only failed to respect this popular decision, but ordered in armed troops to forestall implementation. The official slaughter began on March 26th.

A few documented episodes:

1) Tanks and soldiers with submachine guns and grenades seized Dacca University early in the morning on March 26. All students residing in Iqbal Hall, the dormitory center, were put to death. The building was gutted by shells from tanks.

2) One hundred and three Hindu students residing in Jagannath Hall of Dacca University were shot to death. Six Hindu students were forced at gunpoint to dig graves for the others and then were shot themselves.

3) Professor C. C. Dev, widely respected head of the Department of Philosophy, was marched out of his home to an adjacent field and shot.

4) The last names of other faculty members who were killed or seriously wounded: Minirussaman, Guhathakurta, Munim, Naqui, Huda, Innasali, Ali.

5) Central government troops forced their way into Flat D of Building 34 at the university, seized Professor Muniru Zaman, his son, his brother (employed by the East Pakistan High Court), and his nephew, and marched the group to the first-floor foyer, where they were machine-gunned.

6) A machine gun was installed on the roof of the terminal building at Sadarghat, the dock area of Old Dacca. On March 26, all civilians within range were fired upon. After the massacre, the bodies were dragged into buses. Some were burned. Some were dumped into the Buriganga River, adjacent to the terminal.

7) On the morning of March 28, machine guns were placed at opposite ends of Shandari Bazar, a Hindu artisan center in old Dacca. Central government forces suddenly opened fire on civilians trapped in the bazaar. The corpses were strewn on the street.

8) On the evening of March 28, soldiers invaded Ramna Kalibari, an ancient small Hindu settlement, killing all the occupants (estimated at 200). On March 29, about one hundred corpses were put on display in the village.

9) The flight of civilians from Dacca was blocked at gunpoint.

10) On the morning of April 2, forty soldiers entered a village named Barda, rounded up the male population (approximately 600) and marched them at gunpoint to Gulshan Park; where they were interrogated. Ten members of the group were then taken off; their fate is unknown.

The foregoing represents a small fraction of the authenticated accounts that in the aggregate tell of widespread killings; especially of youth and educated people. It is futile to attempt to estimate the number of dead or wounded. Each city and village has its own tales of horror. It is significant that the government at Islamabad, until only last week, enforced vigorous measures to keep out reporters.

The U.S. State Department is in possession of authenticated descriptions not just of the incidents mentioned above but of countless others. Such reports have been sent to Washington by the American Consul General in Dacca and by American physicians attached to AID. For some reason, the State Department has issued no report covering the information at its disposal.

American guns, ammunition, and other weapons sent to Pakistan were used in the attack on Bengali people.

So were weapons from the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. The United Nations has been helpless in the present situation. The Central government in Pakistan claims it is dealing with an internal situation beyond the jurisdiction of the U.N. the nation.

This may help to explain why the U.N. has so far been unable under its Charter to take action against what appears to be a provable case of genocide. But it doesn’t explain why men of conscience have not stood up in the United Nations to split the sky with their indignation.

The central government at Islamabad has forestalled efforts to send food, medicine, and medical personnel into the devastated zones. It seems inconceivable that this decision can be allowed to stand. The Bengalis may not possess political sovereignty, but they do possess human sovereignty under the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.

The United States has not hesitated to speak sharply and effectively wherever its national interests were involved. Americans have every right to expect the United States to speak sharply when the human interest is involved. If the United States can find it within its means and its morality to send guns to Pakistan, it can also find it within its means and its morality to send food and first aid.

The President has said that events in Vietnam represent a test of American manhood. The proposition is dubious. What is certain, however, is that events in Pakistan are a test of American compassion and conscience.

The Agony of East Pakistan

Readers Digest, November 1971; pp.66-71

David Reed and John E. Frazer

Invaded and devastated by the army of its own government, this tortured land cries out for relief and for justice. If both are not granted still greater horrors may lie ahead

They come out of East Pakistan in endless columns, along trails stained with tears and blood. They are dressed in rags, robbed of everything they owned, the women raped, the children gaunt from hunger. They have been on the move for up to a month, hiding from Pakistan soldiers by day, slogging through flooded rice paddies at night. A vengeful army pursues them to the very border of India. Rifle and machine-gun fire crackles. The bedraggled columns scatter for cover. But soon they are moving again, streaming into India.

Sobbing violently, a middle-aged man says, “The soldiers took my two nephews. They kicked them with their boots, ducked them in an open sewer, then machine-gunned them. After that they took 50 to 60 young men of our village into a field and killed them with bayonets.” A woman who was shot in the leg clutches her daughter and says, “We were just about to cross the border when they started shooting at us. I don’t know what happened to my husband.” A ten-year-old boy, who lost an eye when an army patrol threw a grenade at him as he was tending cattle in a field, says, “Can anyone tell me what happened to my parents?”

Since late last March, when the Pakistan army launched this genocidal attack on the defenseless population of East Pakistan, more than eight million people have been driven from their native land. Millions more will surely follow. Moreover, the refugees have put grave strains on India, pushing India and West Pakistan to the brink of a war that could involve the two arch rivals of the communist world, the Soviet Union and China.

Return to Normal? While the horrors of the refugees are bad enough, something even more ghastIy is going on inside East Pakistan, also known as East Bengal. That land, scene of a devastating cyclone that claimed half a million lives last year,* is now being systematically ravaged by the Pakistan army. Diplomats and other foreigners in Dacca, East Pakistan’s capital, estimate that between a quarter- and a half-million civilians have been slaughtered since March. An American missionary in Dacca grits his teeth and says, “It’s murder-mass murder.”

The military junta that rules Pakistan has tried to cover up the atrocities, and maintains that East Bengal has largely returned to normal. But one of the authors of this article, who spent two weeks there last August, found evidence to the contrary on every hand. Touring three districts of East Bengal by car, he found not a single village or town that had not suffered at the hands of the troops. Many towns were half-empty, homes and shops looted’ and bummed, peopIe either dead, driven into exile or hiding in the countryside.

Perhaps a third of Dacca’s population is gone; its economy is crippled and its people are so terrified that no one ventures outdoors at night. Not far from Dacca, a missionary said, “The soldiers killed 249 people in our village. Fortunately for the wounded, high-powered bullets right through them, so the doctors didn’t have to probe.”

A farmer in a refugee camp along the Indian side of the border (?): “The headmaster of our school sitting on the veranda of his home, grading examination papers, when the soldiers dragged him out on the road and cut his throat.” Told (?) another refugee, “The soldiers found the doctor in our village to dig his own grave; then they shot him. The doctor in a border hospital pointed to a woman who had been raped repeatedly by the troops in the presence of her four children after the soldier had killed her husband.

Rule by Minority. The roo(?) disaster in Pakistan reach back (? Britain’s withdrawal from its Indian empire in 1947. Because India’s Muslim minority feared domination of the Hindu majority, a new IsIamic state called Pakistan was carved out of predominantly Muslim areas of Indian subcontinent. Muslims in the northwest became West Pakistan. Although East Bengal separated from West Pakistan by more than 1000 miles of Indian territory, it was included in the state, as East Pakistan, because people were mostly Muslims, there are profound differences between the two Pakistans. They have different languages. The people of the west, mostly Punjabis, are tall, light-skinned. Their land is (?) arid. East Pakistan, by contrast in tropical, peopled mostly by Bengalis, a small, dark-skinned people.

The Bengalis have long complained bitterly that the Punjabis in the west have treated them as colonial subjects. East Pakistan’s population before the massacres stood at 70 million, as compared with 58 million in the west, but the capital, Islamabad, is in West Pakistan. East Pakistan has accounted for 50 percent or more of Pakistan’s export earnings, chiefly from the production of jute, but the Bengalis claim that the west kept most of the money for its own development. West Pakistanis, moreover, took 80 percent of the jobs in the civil service, 90 percent of the posts in the armed forces.

Although efforts were made in the post-I947 years, democratic institutions never really took root in Pakistan, and in 1958 the military seized power .Then, last year, in a notable effort to return the country to civilian rule, Pakistan’s president, Gen. Yahya Khan, scheduled an election for December. Voters would select a national assembly that would frame a constitution and then assume the role of a parliament. That election set in motion the train of events leading to the present tragedy.

In the election campaign in East Pakistan, the Bengalis were electrified by the message of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, a 51-year-old political moderate who was leader of the Awami, or People’s League. Mujib, as he was popularly known, had spent nearly ten years as a political prisoner of the West Pakistan authorities. Now he campaigned on a program of autonomy for East Bengal which, he told cheering crowds, would shake off the hated domination of Islamabad. The central government could continue to control foreign affairs and defense for all Pakistan, but East Pakistan would govern itself internally and the bulk of its money as it saw fit.

Mujib’s People’s League won a landslide victory, capturing a clear majority in the 313-seat assembly. It not only would play the key role in the drafting of the constitution, but would form the next government for all of Pakistan. Elation swept East Pakistan. Neighboring India rejoiced, too. Mujib was known to be friendly to India. If he took over as Prime Minister of all Pakistan, relations with India would, it was hoped, improve.

“Bomber of Baluchistan.” But on March 1, Yahya, under mounting pressure from politicians in West Pakistan, postponed the opening of the national assembly, which had been set for two days later. The Bengalis, feeling that they were being robbed of their legitimate victory, exploded in riots and demonstrations. Mujib calmed his people, cautioned them against violence; and though he still held out for autonomy, something like a parallel government now existed. On March 23-Pakistan’s Independence Day-Mujib flew a new flag, the green, red and yellow banner of Bangla Desh (the Bengal nation) from his home. The West Pakistanis feared that the East was about to secede, and warned that no government could tolerate such a move.

At this point, a cold-eyed general named Tikka Khan arrived in Dacca to take command of West Pakistan troops stationed there. Tikka had won for himself the nick name “Bomber of Baluchistan” for having suppressed a tribal revolt in Baluchistan province by indiscriminate air and artillery strikes against civilians. Shortly after Tikka’s arrival, Yahya flew to Dacca for talks with Mujib. All the while, West Pakistan soldiers in civilian clothing were being flown into Dacca. On the afternoon of March 25, Yahya, having broken off the talks with Mujib, returned to West Pakistan. At II o’clock that evening, Tikka Khan was unleashed.

Suddenly, all of Dacca rocked with explosions. Troops opened fire with artillery on the city; tanks rumbled through the streets, gunning down anything that moved. The dormitories of the university, a stronghold of Bengali nationalism, were riddled by machine-gun fire. The invading soldiers went on a rampage in the old city, a particular political stronghold of Mujib, breaking down doors, dragging people into the street and shooting them. Shops were looted and burned. The barracks of the pro-Mujib Bengali police were gutted by tank cannon Troops burst into a telephone exchange and killed 40 persons on duty.

Special West Pakistan army squads had lists of people-professors, doctors, businessmen and other community leaders-whom they dragged off to army headquarters. Most have never been seen again. Although Mujib’s follower urged him to go into hiding, Mujib refused. Tikka’s troops took him off to imprisonment and an uncertain fate in West Pakistan.

With Dacca in ruins, Tikka sent his troops into the countryside, in each town the ghastly pattern was repeated. Anyone associated with the People’s League was killed. Young men, Muslim and Hindu alike, were rounded up and murdered. In almost every town, refugees report, women were raped.

The Bengalis Strike Back. Meanwhile, from Islamabad, Yahya whipped off decrees banning the People’s League and postponing the national assembly indefinitely. The new constitution, he declared, would be drafted not by the assembly, but rather by a committee that would handpicked by him. Autonomy for East Bengal was rejected; Islamabad’s rule would continue.

Yahya also imposed strict censor ship on the press: even today the people of West Pakistan have little idea of what is going on in the East. Tikka Khan was appointed governor of East Pakistan, which he ruled with the grace of a Nazi gauleiter in Occupied Europe until he was replaced in August.

Bangla Desh, however, has not been crushed. Surviving Bengali troops and police have formed the nucleus of the Mukti Bahini, or Liberation Army. There is no dearth of volunteers, and it is an open secret that India, which surrounds East Pakistan on three sides, is giving arms, training and encouragement to the Mukti Bahini guerrillas. Operating all along the 1350-mile border, these irregulars stab deeply into East Pakistan. Bombs explode nightly in the capital, and West Pakistan army and patrols are ambushed on country roads. The railway that links Chittagong, the main port, with Dacca has been severed.

Bangla Desh is paying a fearsome price for resistance. After each Mukti Bahini raid, the West Pakistan army, now bolstered to around 70,000 men, levels surrounding villages as “collective punishment.” And each retaliation sets off another column of refugees for India.

The Indian government is making every effort to care for these piteous people, but the influx is so staggering that new miseries await them there. For instance, in one of more than a thousand squalid refugee camps in India, 150,000 people live in straw hovels surrounded by mud and *****. There are few latrines, and the stench is such that people cover their faces with cloth. Because of the vast numbers, refugees have to wait in line for as long as ten hours for their food rations – ¾ pound of rice a day per adult, plus some lentils, vegetables when available, and a little salt and cooking oil.

The children suffer the most. Many are beginning to look like the starving children of Biafra, their ribs protruding, their stomachs distended. Almost all suffer from malnutrition or dysentery. Life-giving milk and other protein foods are available in some of the camps, but the crush is so great that many children never get any. A doctor at a border hospital says, “The children die so quickly that we don’t have time to treat them.”

Anger in India. India, itself one of the poorest and most overcrowded countries on earth, groans – under the burden. Although she has made some important gains in population control in the past six years, her population has now increased enormously. The United States and other foreign governments have responded generously with cash and food (America has given $40 million in food, $30.5 million in cash); yet the cost of supporting the Pakistanis may run to more than a billion dollars a year-nearly a seventh of the annual budget of India’s central government. India cannot give the refugees jobs, because millions of her own people are unemployed. Even the meager rations of the refugees, which cost 13 cents a day, are a point of friction: some 50 million Indians subsist on substantially less.

Many Indians angrily point out that they are being forced to pick up the bill for Pakistan’s atrocities against its own people. Some are urging that India take East Pakistan by military force so as to enable the refugees to return. India’s Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, so far has resisted these pressures-yet danger of war runs high. Such a war might well assume beyond-the-borders proportions. India has a new alliance with the Soviet Union; the Pakistan government has grown increasingly close to China.

Within East Bengal itself, a new horror looms: an acute threat of mass starvation, Even in normal times, the area must import part of its rice supply. Now it will be difficult, if not impossible, to move the rice from the small river ports to all of the outlying areas. In 1943, two to three million Bengalis died in a famine. There is every reason to fear it will be worse this time.

What can be done about this festering disaster ? Many Bengalis see a solution in independence won by guerrilla warfare. There is a chance of success, but also the certainty of much more bloodshed. It would be far better for the United States and other nations to bring pressure to bear on Islamabad to work out a political solution acceptable to the Bengalis and thus to defuse the present explosive situation and stave off a major war in the subcontinent. This done, the refugee columns would be set in motion once more-on a peaceful journey back to their homeland.

Pakistan: Reign of Terror

Newsweek April 19, 1971; p. 52-54

Blealy-eyed from lack of sleep and emotionally drained by what they called their “ten days of terror,” hundreds of Americans who had been trapped in war-ravaged East Pakistan finally got out to safety last week. Nearly 500 of them were evacuated by air from the East Pakistani capital of Dacca. Another 119 foreign nationals, including 37 Americans, were brought out by a British freighter from the battered East Pakistani port city of Chittagong. Most of them begged off from interviews, fearful that anything they said might endanger some 200 Americans-consular officials, businessmen and missionaries-who chose to remain behind in East Pakistan. But a few, unable to contain their outrage at the wanton slaughter they had witnessed, talked guardedly to newsmen. And their harrowing accounts tended to confirm earlier reports of savage repressions by the Punjabi-Ied Pakistani Army in its attempt to stamp out the Bengali rebellion in East Pakistan.

The Americans evacuated from Chittagong told NEWSWEEK’S Tony Clifton that the bitter fighting there had reduced East Pakistan’s largest port to a ghost town. “In the first few days,” recalled Neil O’Toole, a New Yorker working for a private charitable organization, “I actually saw Awami League people [supporters of Bengali nationalist leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman] patrolling the streets with bows and arrows, and I wondered how they could possibly hold off the army with things like that.” Four days later, the reinforced Pakistani Army gained full control of the city and launched a reign of terror. “Some Punjabi soldiers called a kid over and hit him around the head and in the groin and then forced him to his knees,” said Fritz Blankenship, a crane operator who had been employed by an American construction firm. “The kid was crying, begging and the soldiers just watched him for a minute.” Finally, according to Blankenship, “they just shot him out of hand and walked on.”

A similar wave of atrocities was reported by the Americans who had been in Dacca. As soon as the curfew was lifted, they said, at least a half-dozen Americans were met by nearly hysterical Bengali friends who told of a massacre at Dacca University. When three young Americans agreed to investigate the story, they found a staircase in a faculty building splattered with the bloodshed when five teachers were dragged out and coldly mowed down by gunfire. Still more shattering was the experience of Victor Chen, who had been visiting Dacca as a tourist when the war broke out and was led by a group of excited Bengalis to a shantytown set in the middle of Dacca’s sprawling racetrack. “The houses were burned down, and some were still smoldering,” he told NEWSWEEK’S Milan J. Kubic. “Literally dozens of dead bodies were strewn all over the place, many of them small kids, all of them riddled by bullets.” And another young American said in obvious disgust: “We just don’t see why the U.S. should go on supporting a regime that behaves in this fashion.”

Cautious: Indeed, Washington’s policy of calculated ambiguity on Pakistan has left the U.S. open to charges that official silence is tantamount to support for the martial-Iaw regime of President Mohammed Yahya Khan. Even touchier was the charge that U .S.-supplied Patton and Sabre jets were being used Pakistani Army to slaughter Bengalis. But State Department officials argued that the unsettled circumstances dictated a cautious policy. They also pointed out that no American weapons have been Delivered to the Pakistani Army since 1965. And last week, the department’s spokesman, Charles Bray 3rd, expressed “sympathy” to the “victims” and hoped that “it will be possible soon to alleviate the suffering caused by recent events” in East Pakistan. Though U .S. officials denied any implications beyond humanitarian concern, Bray’s use of the word “victims..struck some Pakistani Government officials as a slap at the Yahya Khan regime, which has never conceded that there was much suffering going on in East Pakistan.

Washington, of course, was hardly alone in this dilemma. Both the Soviet Union and Communist China, the principal purveyors of arms to Pakistan since 1965, have only begun to choose their rhetorical stance-with Moscow urging Yahya to find a way to end the fighting and Peking edging toward Yahya’s side. But by far the most difficult position was that facing the government of India, where popular sentiments remained overwhelmingly pro-Bengali and where pressures mounted for direct action. “It is neither proper nor possible for India to keep quiet [over the Pakistani situation),” said Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

The watch-and-wait policy assumed by most foreign governments stemmed from a widely held belief that the Pakistani Army will ultimately fail in its attempt to subjugate 75 million East Pakistanis. Still, fears increased that the army was fully prepared to wreak bloody havoc even in a futile try. An American businessman who was evacuated from Dacca last week recalled asking a Punjabi major why the army was killing so many people. “There are millions of them, and only thousands of us,” the major replied. “The only way we can control these people is by making them scared stiff.” And from what he saw, the American said, “it looked as if the army went berserk. I can’t help feeling sorry about the poor Bengalis in that hell.”