Tag Archives: Mujib Nagar

August 1971

August 1: The “Concert For Bangla Desh” is held. Ravi Shankar conceived the idea of the concert to raise awareness and funds to help the victims of the jihadi Pakistani soldiers. He got together with George Harrison, an ex-Beetle and organised one of the biggest concerts at Madison Square Garden. Shankar, Harrison, Eric Clapton, Bob Dylan, Billy Preston, Leon Russel, Ringo Starr, Klaus Voormann, Badfinger, Pete Ham, Tom Evans, Joey Molland, Mike Gibbons, Allan Beutler, Jesse Ed Davis, Chuck Findly, Marlin Greene, Jeanne Greene, JD Green, Dolores Hall, Jim Horn, Kamala Chakravarty, Jackie Kelso, Jim Keltner, Ustad Ali Akbar Khan, Claudia Lennear, Lou McCreary, Ollie Mitchell, Don Nix, Don Preston, Carl Radle, Alla Rakah performed at this historic concert that brought the genocide to world attention. George Harrison wrote and sang the famous song, “Bangladesh” at the concert thus introducing the nation to the world.

* George/Ringo Help from a friend
* 40000 cheer two beatles

Telegram of Amconsul, Calcutta to Amembassy New Delhi:

“Kazi Zahirul Qaiyum MP of Awami League met consulate official on behalf of Khondkar Mustaque Ahmed to convey to the US government that ‘A.L. Leaders are anxious for political settlement with GOP and are prepared recede from total independence demand.’

When asked about Bangladesh plans, Qaiyum said there have been several long Cabinet meetings recently, and Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed “is at a loss what to do.” He said that seizing and holding “liberated territory” was out of the question as two fully trained and equipped army divisions would be needed to hold significant portion of East Bengal. Rather, he thought Mukti Fouz would continue to emphasize guerrilla tactics in effort to erode West Pakistan’s econ­omy and will. He said AL had some “friends” in West Pakistan who might eventually influence the situation to AL’s advantage. Pakistan might be compelled to change its policy towards East Bengal in six months.

Qaiyum emphasized that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman must play key role in any possible settlement as only Mujib is capable of holding East Bengal people together. If Mujib is tried and executed, all hope for resolution of current impasse will be lost. For this reason Qaiyum asked that US government do everything in its power to ensure Sheikh Mujib’s safety.”

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971. p. 166 – 167


August 2: American Embassy, Islamabad reports to State Department on Dacca Internal Assessment; Lahore Internal Assessment; and Karachi Internal Assessment:

“Security situation has not improved. Some evidence non-cooperation. Persecution of Hindus declining in direct proportion to decline in size Hindu population. Latest estimate puts six million East Pakistan Hindus in India. Hindu monuments being destroyed some areas. Such destruction observed in Dacca and Chittagong and Hindu sculpture now very easy to obtain. Some Dacca streets with Hindu and English names renamed with Muslim names.”

August 3: Yahya announces that Sheikh Mujib will be tried by special military court for ‘waging war against Pakistan’

August 5: Bangladesh Govt hails US House decision

August 6: Telegram from the Department of State to Embassy in India :

“Cross-border shelling by both Indians and Pakistanis has increased as has tempo of guerilla activity which is shifting from sabotage to direct attacks on West Pakistani forces…”

“At a meeting with political officer of the Consulate A.L. M.N.A. Zahirul Qaiyum said
he was acting ‘under specific instruction of Bangladesh Minister who hopes to convince USG to initiate negotiations with GOP which will lead to a meeting of interested parties and peaceful settlement…

According Qaiyum, AL leaders think there is a good chance of war breaking out, perhaps in the next 15-20 days, which would be an enormous disaster for everyone on subcontinent. In long run, AL is confident that it can achieve military victory. East Bengal, however, is being devastated… Under any circumstances an enormous reconstruction job will be required. Qaiyum thought that US was only country capable of providing necessary assistance.”

The Consulate General in Dacca did an assessment of Qaiyum’s role in the Awami League and concluded that he was not prominent in the leadership but was probably a confidant of Khondkar Mushtaq Ahmad, the “Foreign Minister” of the Bangladesh independence movement, and a bona fide representative of Mushtaq. (Telegram 3057 from Dacca, August 8)

August 7: President Nixon wrote (handwritten) personally thank Yahya for his assistance in arranging contacts between the U.S. and China.

August 9: A Press Note issued by the Headquarters of the Chief Martial Law Administrator said that sheikh Mujibur Rahman will be tried by a Special Military Court for “waging war against Pakistan” and other offences. The trial will commence on August 11 in camera and its proceedings will be secret. (THE DAWN, Karachi-August 10, 1971)

A statement by External Affairs Minster of India in Lok Sabha expressing reaction on Sheikh Mujib’s trial:

“What happened after the 25th of March this year is known to the whole world. The denial of the verdict of the people and letting loose of military opp­ression and trampling on the fundamental human rights of the people of Bangla Desh stand self-condemned. Instead of respecting the verdict of the people and acknow­ledging Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the elected and undisputed leader of Bangla Desh. the Pakistan Government has launched a reign of terror and carried out a calculated plan of genocide, the like of which has not been seen in recent times. To stage a farcical trial against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is a gross violation of human rights and deserves to be condemned by the whole world.”

India and Soviet Union enters into a treaty of peace.

Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Irwin to President Nixon on the Indo-Soviet treaty:

“The essence of the Treaty is its provision that in the event of attack or the threat of attack there will be immediate mutual consultations. Each side also undertakes to refrain from giving assistance to any third party taking part in armed conflict with the other party. These clauses not only assure Soviet neutrality in the event of hostilities in South Asia but also the prospect of Soviet assistance and support in the event of war.”

Memorandum of conversation between Indian Ambassador L.K. Jha and Henry Kissinger:

“Mr. Kissinger said he could not be more categorical in pointing out that a war between India and Pakistan would set back Indian-American relations for half a decade. “

August 10: Pakistan filed a protest note against U.N. Secretary General’s statement regarding Sheikh Mujib’s trial.

August 11: Discussion with UN Secretary General and US Secretary of State on UN Relief Effort in East Pakistan.

US Ambassador to Pakistan’s conversation with Pak Army Chief of staff on East Pakistan situation:

“Gen. Hamid acknowledges insurgency activity in East Pakistan is continuing at fairly active pace. He admits to crucial importance of successful political reconciliation but declined to express opinion on prospects. He acknowledges uncertainty on number of persons elected under Awami League ticket last December who will actually come forward to claim their seats in National Assembly. A recent publication ahows a list of 88 Awami League MNAs-elect, who are now cleared to take their seats.

Hamid said he was rather pleased with performance of “Razakars”, recruits (mainly Bengalis) from local population who have been given brief training and then put on armed duty mainly in static defense of bridges and other key structures.”

He adds further:

“GOI has not taken military measures that indicated intention to initiate war against Pakistan.”

Letter from the Indian Ambassador (Jha) to President Nixon:

“We apprehend that this so-called trial will be used only as a publicity to execute Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This will aggravate the situation in East Bengal and will create a serious situation in India because of the strong feelings of our people and all political parties. Hence our grave anxiety. We appeal to you to exercise your influence with President Yahya Khan to take a realistic view in the larger interest of the peace and stability of this region.”

Minutes of Senior Review Group meeting held at US President’s office:

“President Nixon: ‘Let me be very blunt…… The US “must not – cannot – allow” India to use refugees as pretext for breaking up, Pakistan ……. That is what India wants to do.”

August 12: Indo Soviet joint statement:

“Both sides reiterated their firm conviction that….. Urgent steps be taken in East Pakistan for the achievement of political solution and for creation of conditions of safety for the return of the refugees to their homes which alone would answer the interests, of the entire people of Pakistan….”

August 13: Memorandum from Harold Saunders, NSC staff to Henry Kissinger :

“Bangla Desh representatives in India have recently sought out and made contact with middle ranking U.S. officials in New Delhi and Calcutta concerning a settlement with the West Pakistanis. It is not at all clear, however, what they are really fishing for. The approach in Calcutta (by Quayum), allegedly reflecting the Bangla Desh “Foreign Minister’s” wishes, was along the lines of a settlement on the basis of something less than full independence, while the approach by the ‘Foreign Secretary’ (M. Alam) in New Delhi was based on the opposite outcome of total independence.”

With the Bangladesh Guerillas – The New Statesman (Page 1, Page 2)

Bangladesh PM warns against fake trial of Mujib (Page 1, Page 2)

August 14: An officer from the Consulate General in Calcutta met with Bangladesh representative Qaiyum. Qaiyum reaffirmed that he was acting under instructions from his Foreign Minister (Khondoker Mushtaq) who was prepared to accept a negotiated settlement that provided for less than complete independence. Qaiyum emphasized that only Mujibur Rahman could negotiate on behalf of the people of East Bengal, and only he could get them to accept a political settlement. Qaiyum added, “if Sheikh is alive, there is hope for compro­mise, if he is killed, there is no hope.” (Telegram 2321 from USConsul Calcutta)

Telegram from AmConsul Calcutta to Secretary of State:

Foreign Minister Mustaaque planning a trip to Moscow, but would like to visit U.S. First.

August 15: Interview with Aga Hilaly

Statement by senator Edward Kennedy

August 17: Vice Admiral S.M. Ahsan, the governor of East Pakistan until end of February 1971 on current situation:

“Ahsan recommended that special USG representative be sent to talk to Yahya before it is “too late” to explain absolute necessity of finding political solution in East Pakistan, which possible only through rehabilitation and use of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Prior to March at least, separation from Pakistan was not Mujib’s intention and hopefully his attitude has not significantly altered.

The source of power and voice of authority in Pakistan is President Yahya. He is first and last authority.

India’s position, has despite public outcry, been reasonably moderate and its hands before the events in March were relatively clean.”

The Washington Special Actions Group Meeting reiterated that ‘The basic (U.S.) policy is to be helpful in maintaining the integrity of Pakistan.’

August 18: Memorandum from the Kissinger to President Nixon:

– In East Pakistan, a serious insurgency movement is now underway in the countryside and is beginning to penetrate the major cities. This has been fed by the Indians in terms of logistics, training and some arms, but basically reflects a strong Bengali will to resist the West Pakistanis. This in turn provokes an army response which stimulates further refugee flow.

– The refugee flow to India continues. This has increased to a rate of some 50,000 per day after a drop in late July. This could be a temporary aberration; it could result from a new increase in violence; or it could reflect hunger in some pockets. Just maintaining the present number of refugees is projected to cost (Indians) $600 million in a year, a figure larger than the net flow of foreign aid from consortium donors.

August 19: Letter from President Nixon to President Yahya:

Both your officials and ours recognize that the most immediate priority is to mount a major effort to avert famine in East Pakistan. This step is fundamental to progress in re-establishing normal conditions. I am confident that you also share our judgment that it would also be helpful in this task for you to continue your efforts to build on the program announced in your June 28 address for enlisting the support of the elected representatives of the East Pakistani people in the urgent work of national reconciliation.

Meeting with President Yahya, M.M. Ahmad and US Ambassador Farland:

“Yahya discussed his plans to associate Bengalis in administration of province by clearing 88 of former Awami League representatives to National Assembly. He said that only some 15 or 16 of the 88 were presently in Dacca and they were being protected by the government since they feared for their lives. The rest of 88 were either in the countryside or in India. He did not know how many of them would come forward to claim their seat.

After some discussion of this point from several angles it was quite clear that President Yahya refused to deal with any group however cleansed under name of Awami League. He said that he was severely criticized in West Pakistan for having cleared as many as 88 of former AL members to take their seats in next assembly if they came forward.”

He further said on trial of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman “you can stops worrying because I am not going to execute the man even though he is a traitor.”

US Embassy’s telegram confirms that The US ambassador pressured Yahya not to execute Sheikh Mujib. Yahya further stated that because the charge carried the possibility of a death sentence, it was his plan that if such the verdict be, a request for mercy would be made in the Sheikh’s behalf, and he, Yahya, would accept the petition.

August 20: War of annihilation – Al Hawadith –Lebanon

The Pakistani officer stood in one of the small villages of East Pakistan. And told the hungry public gathered around him “My men are wounded and I want some blood, I want volunteers.” Before waiting for a reply, the soldiers rushed forward, selected some young men, threw them on the ground and pricked their arteries. Blood began to flow and continued flowing until the young men died.

A meeting in Calcutta with a representative of the “Bangla Desh” Cabinet and a political officer from US consulate:

–”Any” agreement between Mujib and Yahya will be accept­able if arranged through `proper channels’ i.e. US participa­tion in the arrangements, since “Mujib’s life is more impor­tant than independence”.

–Bangla Desh “Foreign Minister” (Kh. Mustaque) Ahmed would like to head a delegation to the US to discuss their problems with US offi­cials, although they understand they could not be received “officially.”

–There is a split within the Bangla Desh movement between the “rightists” who are in control but want to save them­selves and Mujib through a compromise settlement and “left­wing elements” who will quickly take over if Mujib dies.”

Qaiyum reveals intel on Bangla Desh contacts with India:

“Qaiyum said early August BD Cabinet meetings with GOI offi­cials in New Delhi were mainly concerned with Mukti Bahini (MB) prob­lems. GOI has now agreed MB may purchase arms from abroad and bring them into India. Only foreign arms received to date (other than those taken from Indian army inventory) was consignment of Yugo­slav weapons channeled to MB through GOI. GOI also agreed greatly to step up MB training. In addition to training now given at youth camps and MB centers, Indian army agreed provide additional training for 14,000 men from the western zone and 10,000 from the eastern side of East Bengal each month. From 24,000 total, 5,000 re­cruits monthly will be selected for additional 4 weeks advanced training. Qaiyum said recently India has increased supply of arms for MB. GOI also now manufacturing ammunition for Chinese weapons taken from East Pakistan.

Qaiyum said that he and majority of his colleagues are anti­communists and “rightists.” They want ‘to save themselves,’ and only way they can envisage doing this is to work out compromise in near future.”

August 24: Amembassy, Islamabad reports to U.S. Secretary of State on contacts With Bangladesh Representatives – President Yahya’s reaction :

‘I asked Yahya if he saw any major obstacle to a select group of GOP members,
unpublicized and on neutral ground in a foreign country with a few of the key
people for whom Qaiyum indicated he spoke…. Yahya replied he would favour
such a development wholeheartedly, asking that in case such a contingency
developed, I keep closely in touch with him on this matter generally.

Telegram from Amconsul, Karachi to Secretary of State on Political coordination:

“General mood in Karachi is essentially one of xenophobic defiant support of government and its policies as necessary to preserve integrity of Pakistan. Dominant political figure, Z.A. Bhutto, while not basing complaints on regional bias, has made it quite clear that he believes that military is arbitrarily retaining power, dragging its feet in turning over power to elected representatives of people, and in general mismanaging country. Press has almost uniformly endorsed all policies of MLA whether support given in order to remain in print or out of true conviction.

MLA, as well as President, continue to hold considerable public support. Their position has been helped by relative prosperity of this area. To most people, MLA is still considered saviour and preserver of national unity and any criticisms or complaints levelled tend to be directed against “civilian bureaucrats”. On practical level, few see any workable alternative to military rule.

After India, Sheikh Mujib Rahman and his Awami League rank second in order of disapproval. To most the Sheikh is treacherous collaborator of India. To more generous, he willing dupe to wiles and anti-state plots of Indians and anti-state miscreants. Clearance of former Awami Leaguers MNA’s is acknowledged by most as not overly pleasant necessity and sign of magnanimity by MLA. Jamaat-i-Islam leaders have openly criticized MLA for recognizing traitors.

Small Bengali community in Karachi is generally silent. In security of discussions with foreigners, they express their resentment over government’s decision of putting the sole blame for the problems of day on Bengalis while ignoring the irresponsible action of Bhutto.”

August 25: Secret Telegram from State Department to Amconsul, Calcutta:

“We will welcome continuing analysis and comments : ( a ) possibilities for negotiation between BD reps and GOP, (b) dynamics of possibly troublesome division within BD movement (including Mukti Bahini) over Quote independence vs accommodation UNQUOTE……”

August 28: Secret Telegram from Amconsul Calcutta to Secretary of State:

At meeting with Qaiyum August 27 he showed us note from Bangladesh Fonmin urging Qaiyum to expedite his efforts. According Qaiyum, (US) Congen is ‘only pipeline’ for BD negotiation ef­fort.

Qaiyum said Mukti Bahini guerrilla activity will be greatly stepped up during next month. He said very large number (15,000, he claimed) guerrillas sent into East Bengal August 10-15. The GOP announcement ‘clearing’ 88 MNA’s has caused difficulty for those cleared, who now vulner­able to charge of collaborating. Many of ‘cleared’ MNA’s are making effort to show loyalty to Awami League by making special trip to Calcutta from East Bengal to pledge allegiance, by joining Mukti Bahini.

He said special efforts were being made to disrupt maritime traffic to and from East Bengal, and added that effort would be made to destroy Pakistan ship ‘Padma’ currently enroute to Karachi from US carrying consignment of military equipment.”

August 30: Conversation with retired Maj. – Gen Jilani, NAP ( R ):

Although the NAP (R) had disagreed with the Foreign Trade position in Mujib’s Six Points, surely acceptance of those six points, or whatever, would have been better than the situation that has resulted in East Pakistan.

Some East Pakistan Observations: A trip report by FSO H. Batjer:

“The general atmosphere in East Pakistan is one of sustained anxiety, uncertainty and in some cases real fear. Perhaps the most disturbing element in the East Pakistan situation is the public’s total lack of confidence in the future. Personal security and general well being are nonexistent for most people whether they support the idea of a united Pakistan or Bangla Desh. Without reason, citizens are killed, maimed and/or deprived of family and possessions.

The Mukti Bahini seeks refuge and food from the sympathetic local Bengalis, but their lives are endangered should the local Peace Committee and/or Army collaborators learn of their support.”

June 1971

June 3: US ambassador to India, Keating suggested Kissinger that military assistance to Pakistan was out of the question since they were still killing in East Pakistan and when refugees were still pouring into India. Kissinger informed him that the President would uphold the “One Time Exception” of arms sales to Pakistan.

June 4: Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger:

Nixon: Look, even apart from the Chinese thing, I wouldn’t do that to help the Indians, the Indians are no goddamn good. Now Keating, like every Ambassador who goes over there, goes over there and gets sucked in. He now thinks the—
Kissinger: Those sons-of-bitches, who never have lifted a finger for us, why should we get involved in the morass of East Pakistan? All the more so, I quite agree with the point, if East Pakistan becomes independent, it is going to become a cesspool. It’s going be 100 million people, they have the lowest standard of living in Asia—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: No resources. They’re going to become a ripe field for Communist infiltration. And then they’re going to bring pressure on India because of West Bengal. So that the Indians in their usual idiotic way are playing for little stakes, unless they have in the back of their minds that they could turn East Pakistan into a sort of protectorate that they could control from Calcutta. That they may have in the back of their mind.”

June 11: Lunch Conversation Between Indian Ambassador Jha and Mr. Kissinger -The purpose of the conversation was to prepare for the meeting of Foreign Minister Singh and also to prevent Indian military action against Pakistan while the Chinese channel was being maintained.

Telegram from the embassy in India to the Department of State:

The number of refugees is now 5.4 million and that rate of flow is increasing. This should be evidence enough that no matter what noises President Yahya may make about restoration of normalcy, he has not yet done anything to effectively impede reign of terror and brutality of Pakistan army, the root cause of the refugee exodus. I most strongly recommend that the time is overdue for us to utilize all leverage available to pressure the GOP into halting without further delay the terror and repression by the army in the east wing.

Rally in New York in support for the cause of Bangladesh.

June 13: Genocide in Bangladesh: – Anthony Mascarenhas, former Assistant Editor, Morning News, Karachi (published in Sunday Times, London):

He was 24 years old, a slight man surrounded by soldiers. He was trembling, because he was about to be shot.

“Normally we would have killed him as he ran,” I was informed chattily by Major Rathore, the G-2 Ops. of the 9th Division, as we stood on the out­skirts of a tiny village near Mudafarganj, about 20 miles south of Comilla. “But we are checking him out for your sake. You are new here and I see you have a squeamish stomach.”

“Why kill him?” I asked with mounting concern.

“Because he might be a Hindu or he might be a rebel, perhaps a student or an Awami Leaguer. They know we are sorting them out and they betray themselves by running.”

“But why are you killing them? And why pick on the Hindus?” I persisted.

“Must I remind you,” Rathore said severely, “how they have tried to des­troy Pakistan? Now under the cover of the fighting we have an excellent oppor­tunity of finishing them off.”

“Of course,” he added hastily, “we are only killing the Hindu men. We are soldiers, not cowards like the rebels. They kill our women and children.”

The pogrom’s victims are not only the Hindus of East Bengal-who constitute about 10 per cent of the 75 million population-but also many thousands of Bengali Muslims.”

Tajuddin’s appeal for aid, recognition.

Tajuddin’s appeal to the world for Sheikh Mujib’s safety.

June 15: Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to India:

“In the context of briefing Nixon in advance of his meeting with the Indian Foreign Minister, Keating painted a grim picture of the situation in East Pakistan. He suggested that Nixon could put pressure on Pakistan to stop what he described as genocide in East Pakistan by withholding economic assistance. Keating pointed to the flood of five million refugees into India and said that the problem was growing at a rate of 150,000 a day. The strain on India was tremendous, and Keating said that the situation was further inflamed by what he described as a deliberate policy by Pakistan to drive out or kill the Hindus in East Pakistan. His assessment of the Indian response to the problem was that India wanted the killing stopped and a climate created in East Pakistan which would allow the refugees to return to their homes. In his view, India had adopted a moderate position and was seeking a political solution to the building crisis. Keating did not believe a political settlement would emerge until Yahya Kahn’s government was prepared to deal with the Awami League leaders who had been outlawed.” (Summary)

June 16: President Nixon met at the White House with Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh. Ambassadors Jha and Keating were also present, as were Henry Kissinger and Joseph Sisco. Nixon suggested quiet diplomacy by offering aid for the refugee instead of putting pressure on Yahya (Details).

June 18: Letter from Pakistani President Yahya to President Nixon:

“It is most unfortunate that this humanitarian question should be cynically turned into political propaganda by India, and that the Indian Government should use the problem of the displaced persons, as an instrument of pressure on Pakistan to impose a political government of Indian choice in East Pakistan. No government could yield to such blackmail.”

World Bank report after a visit by a delegation to East Pakistan:

The situation is far from normal. The general sense of fear and lack of confidence on the part of most of the population.

Tajuddin on political solution of the crisis.

June 19: Protests in Hyde Park London against Pakistani atrocities.

June 22: Telegram from the Department of State to the embassy in Pakistan:

“We have received through international air mail a letter mailed from Berlin without return address which purported to ask for recognition of the ‘People’s Republic of Bangladesh’. It would be inappropriate for us to take any action with respect to it since we consider the territory of East Pakistan to be part of the State of Pakistan.”

June 23: Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam to US- don’t contribute to genocide.

June 25: Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon:

“On June 22 The New York Times reported that two Pakistani freighters were preparing to sail from New York with cargos of military equipment for Pakistan. Ambassador Jha called on Under Secretary Irwin on the same day to warn that if the report were true, the shipment of arms to Pakistan would have an unfortunate impact upon relations between the United States and India.”

June 26: East Pakistan Refugees: Discussions with Sadruddin of UNHCR who had pro Pakistan views.

June 28: Letter from Pakistani President Yahya to US President Nixon: Yahya was troubled by media reports of Western governments (like UK) enforcing aid embargo on Pakistan to pressure a political settlement. All these developments have led to a strong and widespread public reaction in Pakistan.

He requested Nixon to “prevent the present ambiguity and misunderstanding from becoming a source of further strains in Pakistan’s relations with the Western world.”

Yahya’s public address to the nation:

Pakistan’s new political leaders would not include any representatives of the outlawed Awami League of East Pakistan under that party label. While reiterating the illegal status of the League, Yahya announced that Awami League members-elect of the national and provincial assemblies who had not disqualified themselves by secessionist activities would be eligible to participate in those bodies. Those Awami Leaguers who had disqualified themselves would be replaced through by-elections to take place this fall.

Banning Awami League made political accommodation impossible. The disqualification of many of the 440 Awami League members-elect and its probable unacceptability to most of the others means that most of those seats would have to be filled through by-elections in East Pakistan.

US president Nixon refused a proposal for arms embargo on Pakistan.

Telegram from the embassy in Pakistan to the US Department of State regarding the subject of East Pakistan Refugees: Special Assistant Kellogg’s Discussion with Pres. Yahya:

“Yahya launched into bitter attack on PM Gandhi and her government. He referred to statements in which Mrs. Gandhi reported to have said that refugees can’t go back. ‘Indian Government says they won’t let them go back.’ Some of the few refugees who have trickled back, he said, show wounds and say they were beaten up on main roads in India leading back to Pakistan. Kellogg interjected that none of Indian officials with whom he had spoken had indicated anything other than that India wanted refugees to return to East Pakistan as soon as possible. Kellogg noted enormous economic, religious, political and social pressures on India resulting from refugee influx, and GOI estimated that $400 million would be required to care for refugees over six-month period.

Kellogg repeated that none of Indian officials with whom he had spoken had said they wanted refugees to remain; nor had any referred to desire to see independent East Pakistan; “Bangla Desh” was never once mentioned to him. Meanwhile, if persons were continuing to leave East Pakistan and not returning in any appreciable numbers, Kellogg said, it would appear that they continued to be motivated by fear which caused them to flee in first place.”

June 29: US Dept. of State Report: Scenario for action in Indo-Pakistan crisis (pdf file)

Telephone conversation between the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs (Sisco).

Bhasani – No compromise with Yahya on independence.

Bangladesh Home Minsiter’s reaction on Yahya’s plans for holding by-election.

June 30: Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam’s address – Yahya will get a reply on the battlefield.

May 1971

May 3: Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of East Pakistan (Bangla Desh) on the situation in Bangladesh:

“A just struggle:

(i) The present struggle of the people of Bangla Desh is the culmination of their struggle for democracy and autonomy which they were conducting since 1948 against the reactionary ruling classes which had ruthlessly suppressed democracy and national rights of the various nationalities.

(ii) The people of Bangla Desh and their leaders had never wanted the secession of East Pakistan. But they had always tried to establish their democratic and national rights through democratic struggles and through the election held in 1970. Even after a sweeping victory in the election and securing an absolute majority in the National Assembly, the Awami League and its Chief Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had wanted nothing more than a constitution based on the six-point programme. Sheikh Mujib had also repeatedly tried to come to a political settlement with the ruling military junta.

(iii) But it was the ruling military junta, which had earlier held the election but had ultimately refused to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people, that launched a treacherous armed attack against the people. In fact, the military junta had no intention of transferring power. The Yahya-Mujib talks, etc., were nothing but ruse by the junta to gain time for preparation of the armed attack.

It was only after this armed attack by the ruling military junta that the popular struggle for democracy and autonomy had turned into an armed battle for the liberation of our motherland.

(iv) This liberation battle is fundamentally a battle for the just right of self-determina­tion of the 75-million Bengalis waged against the reactionary ruling classes composed of the monopolists and feudalists who are backed and armed by the imperialists, especially the U.S. imperialists.

(v) In no case it is a struggle against the people of West Pakistan. Rather this liberation struggle of Bangla Desh against the reactionary ruling classes which are also suppressing and oppressing the people of West Pakistan will help their struggle for democracy and autonomy.

(vi) The liberation struggle is being carried on by the Mukti Fouz (Liberation Army) and the people of Bangla Desh. Therefore, the propaganda by the ruling military junta of Pakistan that it is an ” India-inspired struggle “, ” by Indian armed intruders ” and that ” India is interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan “, etc., is nothing but a canard. Similarly, the propaganda by some pro-Peking groups that this liberation struggle is inspired by the imperialists is a dire falsehood.

Judging all the above facts, all democrats of the world should be fully convinced that the present struggle for the liberation of our motherland is a just struggle against native and foreign reactionaries who are enemies of humanity and peace. The defeat of these reactionaries in Bangla Desh will strengthen the forces of democracy and peace in the South-east Asia region.”

May 4: Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State on the subject of alleged Indian support to Freedom Fighters and other observations:

“Foreign Secretary Kaul referred me to the reports of Frank Moraes in the Indian Express as well as to those of British and American journalists regarding the organization and training of the liberation forces inside East Pakistan. Kaul said the refugees were in no state to fight. They were hungry, sick and at times almost naked.”

May 5: Memorandum from The Acting Secretary to Christopher Van Hollen:

“In the last ten days we have received through clandestine reports and journalists’ accounts increasing evidence of Indian involvement with the Bengali separatists and of India’s own contingency planning in the event of war. The Indian Government has reinforced Border Security Force units and has moved regular Indian Army units to within three kilometers of the border. The BSF has established camps at which 2,000 Bengalis are reportedly receiving training in guerilla and sabotage tactics. Limited quantities of arms and ammunition have been provided to the Bengali separatists and some Indian forces have infiltrated into East Bengal to provide assistance and training to the separatists.”

May 7: Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya expressing concern but using soft tone.

May 10: A conversation among economic advisor to President Yahya Khan (M.M. Ahmed), Assistant to the President (Kissinger), Ambassador of Pakistan(Agha Hilaly), NSC staff (Harold H. Saunders).

nixon_hilaly_kissinger.jpg
Nixon and Kissinger confer with Ambassador Hilaly

(Image credit: Doc Kazi from Flickr)

Nixon declared to a Pakistani delegation that “Yahya is a good friend.” Rather than express concern over the ongoing brutal military repression, Nixon explained that he “understands the anguish of the decisions which [Yahya] had to make.” He said that the US is not going to become involved.

May 13: The Indian Government requested that the United States make available four C-130 transport aircraft and the crews to fly them to help ferry refugees from East Pakistan from the over-burdened state of Tripura to Assam (Telegram 7325 from New Delhi)

Letter from Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to President Nixon:

“Until the 12th May, 1971, the number of fugitives who were registered on their crossing the border into India was 2,328,507. We believe that there is a fair number who have avoided registration. Refugees still continue to pour in at the rate of about fifty thousand a day. We are doing our utmost to look after them. But there is a limit to our capacity and resources. Apparently, Pakistan is trying to solve its internal problems by cutting down the size of its population in East Bengal and changing its communal composition through an organised and selective programme of eviction; but it is India that has to take the brunt of this.

It is our earnest hope that the Government of the United States of America will impress upon the rulers of Pakistan that they owe a duty towards their own citizens whom they have treated so callously and forced to seek refuge in a foreign country.”

May 14: The Embassy in Islamabad warned that Pakistan would react unfavorably to a United States decision to participate in an airlift of East Pakistani refugees.

(The Department of State announced on June 12 that the United States would participate in the airlift. The airlift exercise, which was code-named Bonny Jack, was terminated on July 14. source)

May 17: Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger about halting military assistance to Pakistan. Kissinger responded with a handwritten comment in the margin that reads: “Al-See me. The end result of this will be to terminate the relationship.”

May 18: A research study on Pakistan by Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

May 20: Interview with Bangladesh home Minister A.H.M. Kamaruzzaman.

May 21: Dr. Kissinger told Indian Ambassador Jha “you can’t go to war over refugees.”

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(Image credit: UNHCR)

May 23: President Yahya said that he tended to disagree with GOI’s current estimate that there were now over two and one-half million East Pakistani refugees in India, but that the GOP was aware of the fact that a substantial number of people had crossed the border and that the problem was both real and substantial.

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Mrs. Indira Gandhi, premier of India, with her popularity again elected as Prime Minister in March, 1971

(Image credit: Kana_ratnam from Flickr)

May 24: Indira Gandhi’s statement in Lok Sabha on the situation in Bangla Desh:

“It is mis­chievous to suggest that India has had anything to do with what happened in Bangla Desh. This is an insult to the aspirations and spontaneous sacrifices of the people of Bangla Desh, and a calculated attempt by the rulers of Pakistan to make India a scapegoat for their own misdeeds. It is also a crude attempt to deceive the world community. The world press has seen through Pakistan’s decep­tion. The majority of these so-called Indian infiltrators are women, children and the aged.

We are proud of our tradition of tolerance. Our nation, our people are dedicated to peace and are not given to talking in terms of war or threat of war.

We are convinced that there can be no military solution to the problem of East Bengal. A political solution must be brought about by those who have the power to do so.”

Letter from President Yahya to President Nixon:

“The secessionist elements in East Pakistan were encouraged and assisted by India. The Indian Parliament, in an unprecedented move, officially extended sympathy and support to these elements. The question of “recognising” the rebellious movement has also been under consideration of the Indian Government. Infiltrators and saboteurs from across the border have violated our territory and indulged in activities to dislocate and destroy East Pakistan’s economic and industrial life, including the vital communications system.

It is most unfortunate that due to disturbed conditions and for other reasons, a large number of people left their homes in East Pakistan and crossed into India. I have, therefore, in a public statement urged the law abiding citizens of East Pakistan who were compelled to migrate, to return to their homes and resume their normal duties. I am afraid, however, that I cannot extend a welcome to those persons who committed murders, indulged in rape and arson, destroyed private and public properties and looted Government treasuries and food stores. No Government can condone such crimes against the people and the State.”

May 25: 50KW Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendro (Independent Bangladesh radio) opened in Baliganj, Kolkata by Bangla Desh PM Tajuddin

May 26: The State Department gave a memorandum to President Nixon expressing fears of an imminent Indo-Pak war. The memorandum noted 3 points that would be the cause of the war.

1. Continued military repression in the East (Bangladesh), economic dislocation and lack of political accomodation in East Pakistan (Bangladesh)

2. The very heavy flow of refugees to India (over three million according to the Indians) which is imposing a great burden to India.

3. And the Indian cross-border support to Bengali guerrillas (Mukti Bahinis).

India Government decision on Pakistan crisis:

The following decisions were made:
a. Defer recognition of Bangla Dash for the immediate future.
b. Maintain constant military readiness.
c. Take every diplomatic step to force the major powers to take action to force the GOP to atop the refugee flow and to repatriate those who have crossed into India, including hints that Mia might bke unilateral military action.
d. Seek financial aid from all sources to temporarily support the refugees.
They also decided to release off-the-record press comments that India is reaching the point where some sort of action, possibly military, was possible if there is not immediate relief for the refugee problem.”

Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger:

Nixon: But we don’t say anything against Yahya?
Kissinger: No, no. You just say you hope the refugees will soon be able to go back to East Pakistan. He will then reply to you that’s exactly what he wants.
I’ve got it all arranged with the—
Nixon: Good. Go ahead.
Kissinger: —Embassy. Then you can take credit. You can tell the Indians to pipe down—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And we’ll keep Yahya happy.
Nixon: The Indians need—what they need really is a—
Kissinger: They’re such bastards.
Nixon: A mass famine. But they aren’t going to get that. We’re going to feed them—a new kind of wheat. But if they’re not going to have a famine the last thing they need is another war. Let the goddamn Indians fight a war [unclear].

May 27: The East Bengal tragedy: (THE GUARDIAN, London)

The total picture of what has been happening in East Bengal is clear to us without any shadow of doubt. There are scores of survivors of firing-squad line-ups. Hundreds of wit­nesses to the machine-gunning of political leaders, prefessors, doctors, teachers and students. Villages have been surrounded, at any time of day or night, and the frigh­tened villagers have fled where they could, or been slaughtered where they have been found. or enticed out to the fields and mown down in heaps. Women have been raped, girls carried off to barracks, unarmed peasants battered or bayoneted by the thousands.

The pattern, after seven weeks, is still the same. Even the least credible stories, of babies thrown up to be caught on bayonets, of women stripped and bayoneted vertically, or of children sliced up like meat, are credible not only because they are told by so many people, but because they are told by people without sufficient sophistication to make up such stories for political motives. We saw the amputation of a mother’s arm and a child’s foot. These were too far from the border, and gangrene developed from their bullet-wounds. Many saw their daughters raped and the heads of their children smashed in. Some watched their husbands, sons, and grandsons tied up at the wrists and shot in more selective male elimination.

About 400 were killed at Chaudanga while on their way to India, surroun­ded and massacred. Why? Lest they take tales to India? Or because choosing a certain democratic system under Sheikh Mujib means forfeiting the right to live in any country?”

May 28: Letter from President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya talks about humanitarian aids not about the Pak atrocities.

May 29: Interview with PM Tajuddin Ahmed

May 30: Bangladesh Home Minister reacts on President Yahya’s speech

April 1971

April 1: New York Times reports heavy killing in Dhaka.

Muslim League President Mumtaz Daultana:

Mujib’s demands were much as President Yahya had spelled out in his address to the nation, except that Yahya had not detailed Mujib’s views on an interim central government. Mujib had wanted Yahya to remain as President with no political government at the Center. Mujib was not “particularly concerned” about the Six Points and was willing to accept an interim arrangement based on the 1962 Constitution. However, he envisaged that the President would allow the Awami League to exercise full control over the affairs of East Pakistan, while the President would perform a coordinating role for inter-provincial affairs of the West Wing. On the “two-Assembly” proposal, Daultana said Mujib had been rather vague as to whether he really envisaged two separate assemblies or two subcommittees of the National Assembly.

Mujib replied, and Daultana accepted his response as sincere, that while he was under great pressure to declare an independent Bangla Desh, he wanted to maintain Pakistan. Mujib was convinced the West Pakistan establishment as represented by Yahya and Bhutto would never permit Bengalis to rule Pakistan.

April 3: Background to the Thinning Out of the U.S. Presence in East Pakistan

April 4: The Pakistani ambassador to USA Agha Hilaly tells Assistant Secretary (USA) Sisco:

The army had to kill people in order to keep the country together.

The Slaughter in East Pakistan“, Editorial, The Times, London

“From the evidence available one must conclude that the aim was so to wipeout the Awami League leadership that it could no longer provide an effec­tive leadership for any resistance movement.”

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April 6: Archer Blood, the US Consul General, officers of USAID and USIS sents the famous blood telegram to the Department of State condemning the failure of the US to denounce the suppression of democracy and the widespread attrocities.

Converstaion between Nixon and Kissinger

April 7:Foreign evacuees from East Pakistan tell of grim fight“, Sydney H. Schanberg, in New York Times.

April 8: Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State:

“Two weeks after Yahya sent army into action, Pak military has control major cities in east, but Bengalis still hold major areas, especially in countryside. Bengali grievances now etched in blood. For present, Awami Leaguers leading resistance forces. If AL movement crumbles before it able consolidate position on ground, resistance movement likely to pass to more radical and left extremist groups such as Naxalites.

Bhutto is eager for power and he may be prepared make deal with military to play key, if not leading role, in new central government.”

April 10: The proclamation of independence order from Mujib Nagar (which was issued on April 10 shall be deemed to have come into effect from March 26, 1971).
The gadget of proclamation of independence on April 10, 1971

US Consul General Archer Blood’s telegram from Dhaka:

“It is, in our opinion, a minor miracle that no American was killed or injured by trigger-happy Pak troops fresh from killing and looting during the delay caused by our accetance of Govt. of Pakistan arrangements.”

April 11: Radio adress by Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed, Prime Minister, on behalf of the
Government of Bangla Desh headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, broadcast by Swadhin
Bangla Desh Betar Kendra to the people of Bangladesh.

“Today a mighty army is being formed around the nucleus of professional soldiers, from the Bengal Regiment and E.P.R. who have rallied to the cause of the liberation struggle. These have been joined by the Police, Ansars and Mujahids and now by thou­sands of Awami League and other volunteers and are being trained into a fighting force ready to use the captured weapons from the defeated West Pakistani mercenaries and fresh arms being purchased from funds collected by our Bengali Brothers overseas.

In Chittagong and Noakhali we have commissioned Major Zia Rahman of the Bengal Regiment to take full command of operations. His heroic defence of Chittagong City against overwhelming odds, which included attacks from the air and sea, will take its place with the defence of Stalingrad in the annals of warfare.”

Mujib is the Head of War Cabinet for Bangladesh.

April 12: CIA’s assessment about the present and prospective state of Pakistani civil war and role of India and other powers.

April 13: “Chinese government holds that what is happening in Pakistan at present is purely internal affair of Pakistan, which can only be settled by Pakistan people themselves and which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever.” –Chou En Lai

April 14:Rhetoric and Reality”, Editorial, Guardian, London:

“Nobody can tell precisely what Yahya’s strategists whispered in his ear three weeks ago. They appear to have thought that cutting off the head would kill Bengali nationalism: precisely the reverse. They appear to have forgotten about world opinion. They appear, most insanely of all, to have ruled India out of the military calculations, so that the uncontrolled border and aid seeping in has them as much by the throat as proliferatin- diplomatic complications.”

Liberation forces organized, General MAG Osmani made Chief in command

April 16:Blood of Bangla Desh“, New Statesman, London:

“If blood is the price of a people’s right to independence, Bangla Desh has overpaid. The Bengalis’ case for statehood may be hard to refute, but it is inconvenient to every one else. And yet, by an unusual combination of circum­stances, Bangla Desh has managed to obey all the rules. So, this may be the moment to consider what we, and other countries, mean by those splendid words which recur like a chorus in the United Nations charter: `the right to self-deter­mination of peoples’. Objectively or subjectively, in Chinese or English, in capi­talist or socialist jargon, it is hard to fault the East Bengalis, or justify their abandonment by all the major powers.”

Memorandum from Senior Review Group meeting regarding Pakistan – American relations

April 17: The formation of Bangladesh Government:

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The First Bangladesh Government is Formed in exile. Awami League leaders convene in the district of Meherpur near the Indian border in Jessore, in the village of Baidyanathtala later renamed Mujibnagar, and affirm Sheikh Mujib’s March 26 proclamation for an independent Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is declared the President of the newly formed Republic, and Syed Nazrul Islam the Vice-President. Nazrul Islam assumes the reponsibilities of the Interim President, and appoints Tajuddin Ahmed as the Prime Minsiter to lead the provisional government.

* Tajuddin Ahmed’s April 10, 1971 Proclamation
* Members of The Mujibnagar Government

More here:
Mujibnagar Day: A milestone in our liberation war
BANGLA DESH BECOMES A REPUBLIC – THE SUNDAY STATESMAN, New Delhi-April 18, 1971

April 18: Telegram from the Department of State to the embassy in Pakistan on the Provisional Government of Bangla Desh.

April 19: Minutes of Senior Review Group meeting regarding Pakistan.

Kissinger: “I agree I used to think that 30,000 men couldn’t possibly subdue 75 million, which I suppose is the Western way of looking at it. But if the 75 million don’t organize and don’t fight, the situation is different.”

April 20: Press Statement issued by Professor Muzaffar Ahamed, President of National Awami Party (NAP), Bangla Desh concerning full support to Bangla Desh Government:

“We declare in unequivocal terms that the government headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is the only legally constituted government of Bangla Desh. And urge upon all the democratic and progressive nations of the world ‘to recognise the newly-born state and its government and to render all material help and moral support.”

April 21: Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani’s appeal to world leaders:

“I appeal to you. Mr. Secretary-General (UN), in the name of humanity to issue an immediate appeal to stop these brutal massacres of innocent people and to extend all possible help for the relief of the victims of dictator General Yahya Khan against military rule in Bangla Desh. I would welcome sending your observers inside Bangla Desh to see the nature and volume of looting, arson, mass killings and molestation of women by West Pakistani Army so that they can reveal the true picture of the sordid tale of Bangla Desh to the people of the world through the United Nations.”

Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury made special representative of Bangladesh Government.

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April 22: Press statement of Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, President of National Awami Party, Bangladesh:

“The question is whether the people of the world and nation of the world will support the struggle of the 71 crore people of Bengal for independence or support the abominable conspiracy of the dictatorial exploiting ruling clique which is indulg­ing in mass murder.

Yahya, who is a Muslim himself, in the name of religion is mercilessly killing lakhs of Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Buddhists. His soldiers who say that they are Muslims are raping women, including Muslim women. Though Muslims themselves, they are destroying mosques. They kill Muslims who are offering prayers. What will the Muslim world do about this ? Will they support the un-Islamic antihumanity abominable policy of Yahya ? Or will they support the cause of truth, justice and love as preached by Islam ?”

April 27: Maulana Abdul Mannan, General Secretary of Muslim League issued a statement saying that “patriotic” (by which he meant Islamic minded) people imbued with the zeal of crusading (Jihad) had come forward to welcome the (maurauding) army of West Pakistan.

April 28: Tajuddin pleas for arms aid and thus help a new-born country to free itself from the clutches of a murderous army. (The Times of India- New Delhi-April 29, 1971)

Henry Kissinger wrote in a secret memo to President Nixon:

The Pakistani army was poised to “retake” physical control of the major towns and that the ressistance was too poorly organised. He also said that the West Pakistanis were afraid that their economy would crash without emergency foreign aid. Till this day the country survives on foreign aid, like Bangladesh. Kissinger feared that Yahya might be forced to let East Pakistan (Bangladesh) go if this news leaked out.

Kissinger recommended Give serious assistance to Yahya Khan to end the war and bring about an arrangement which would be transitional to autonomy in Bangladesh. He suggested sending aid to Pakistan so that later the US would be in a position to pressurize Pakistan into adhering to the arangement.

The feedback from Nixon was an instruction not to squeeze Yahya Khan at the moment.

April 29: Memorandum from Haig to President Nixon on relief assistance for East Pakistani refugees in India:

According to the Indians, there are now over 500,000 East Pakistani refugees and they expect their numbers could eventually total one to two million. The magnitude of this problem-coming suddenly as it does-is beyond India’s limited resources.

It is recommended that you approve this $2.5 million modest program of assistance to East Pakistani refugees to be administered through appropriate international and voluntary agencies.*

* President Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation on April 29. The Embassy in India was informed of the President’s decision in telegram 75479 to New Delhi, May 1.”