Tag Archives: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Text of Simla Agreement & War Criminals

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Simla Agreement on Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan was signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and President of Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto, in Simla on July 2, 1972. The Agreement was ratified on July 28, 1972 and came into force from August 4, 1972.

The Text of the SIMLA AGREEMENT

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people.

In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:

(i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries.
(ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peace and harmonious relations.
(iii) That the prerequisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful coexistence respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.
(iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means.
(v) That they shall always respect each other’s national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality.
(vi) That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.
Both governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.
In order progressively to restore and normalise relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that:
(i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land, including border posts, and air links, including over flights.
(ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country.
(iii) Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.
(iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.
In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details.

In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the governments agree that:
(i) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.
(ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.
(iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.
This agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with effect from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.
Both governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that in the meanwhile the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.

Source:

The national encyclopedia of Bangladesh Banglapedia records the event as:

Simla Agreement a peace settlement reached between India and Pakistan following the WAR OF LIBERATION of Bangladesh in 1971 which India supported as an ally. The Pakistan army surrendered on 16 December 1971, and the whole army was taken to safety as Prisoners of War. Bangladesh was eager to try them as war criminals. Releasing the prisoners from the Indian custody and keeping them away from the threatened war trial became a grave national issue for the government of Pakistan. On the other hand, India needed to restore normal relations with Pakistan in order to restore its image as a peace loving nation. Pakistan Prime Minister Z.A Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi met in a summit meeting at Simla (28 June-2 July 1972) and signed the peace treaty.

According to the terms of the agreement, India and Pakistan decided to put an end to all hostilities and establish friendly relations between them in all affairs- regional and international and restore the status quo in Jammu and Kashmir as on 17 December 1971. Under this agreement India returned all prisoners of war to Pakistan without holding any trial. India also made a ‘package deal’ with Pakistan, not mentioned in the agreement, under which Pakistan was to accord diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh and open negotiations for mutually exchanging the citizens opting for Bangladesh and Pakistan. [Asha Islam]

Conclusion

A careful reading of the text shows that in the agreement, the signatories Prime minister India Gandhi of India and President Z. A. Bhutto of Pakistan were more concerned for normalizing the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan. There was off-the-record understanding for the diplomatic recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan. The question of genocide and war crimes is either ignored or neglected and India returned all prisoners of war to Pakistan without holding any trial.

Composed by Dr. M. Razzaque from BUET

March 1, 1971: Pakistan’s “gravest political crisis.”

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Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)/1/

 

Washington, March 1, 1971.

 

/1/ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 1 Mar 71-15 May 71. Secret. Sent for information.

 

SUBJECT
Situation in Pakistan
Events in Pakistan today took a major step toward a possible early move by East Pakistan for independence. The following are a brief situation report and some policy considerations flowing from it.

 

The Situation


President Yahya Khan has announced the postponement until “a later date” of the National Assembly, which was to have begun drafting a new constitution in Dacca on Wednesday,/2/ so the political leaders of East and West Pakistan can settle their differences. Yahya characterized the situation as Pakistan‘s “gravest political crisis.”

 

/2/ March 3.

 

The future course of events now depends largely on the decision of Mujibur Rahman and the other leaders of the dominant Awami League party in East Pakistan. A general atmosphere of tension prevails throughout Dacca, and numerous spontaneous processions and demonstrations calling for the independence of East Pakistan are reported to be underway./3/ So far violence reportedly has been limited, but the potential for major destructive outbursts would seem to be great, especially if the West Pakistani-controlled provincial regime takes any heavy-handed actions against the demonstrators.

 

In terms of substantive issues, the differences between Rahman and Bhutto seem to have largely narrowed to those of foreign trade and aid. Bhutto in a speech February 28 said he felt the central government would have to retain control in these fields if its control of foreign affairs was to be realistic.

 

The constellation of political forces and interests in Pakistan is such that any compromise is most difficult at this point. Yahya and Bhutto are both opposed to Rahman’s plan for decentralized government but they both have different and conflicting bases of support:

 

–Yahya’s base of support is the army and economic elite. They do not want to compromise with Bhutto because they fear his platform of “equitable distribution of the wealth.” They figure that the weak central government the East wants would loosen their grip on West Pakistan. The Army feels it would jeopardize security.

 

-Bhutto’s base is the masses. He does not want to compromise with the East because he wants to control a strong central government.

 

The two men have different ideological outlooks-Yahya a fairly conservative approach and Bhutto a leftist and populist approach. So while they both oppose Rahman, they are also commited to not seeing each other gain a predominant position in any ensuing government.

 

Rahman is almost solely concerned about East Pakistan and is unwilling to compromise on the autonomy issue. Because he favors normalization of relations with India, he is in further conflict with Yahya and Bhutto who are both fairly hard-line toward India. The scope for compromise is probably minimal and Rahman could well decide that now is the best time to opt out of the Pakistani union. He clearly had this on his mind when he talked with Ambassador Farland on Sunday/4/ and asked about U.S. aid to an independent East Pakistan and as a lever to prevent West Pakistan from intervening militarily against a succession [secession] movement.

 

President Yahya is well aware that he is risking a strong East Pakistani reaction, but presumably decided that the alternative to postponement would be even worse. He may have seen two principal alternatives: (1) postpone the session and-although he left some room for maneuver-risk an immediate confrontation with East Pakistan; or (2) hold the session, risk an immediate confrontation with his army, the West Pakistani political/economic establishment, or both, and, because he would in the end have to reject an East Pakistan autonomy constitution, a confrontation with the East Pakistanis in a few months.

 

Thus, Yahya is unable to compromise with Rahman or move closer to Bhutto without jeopardizing his own base of power and risking his ouster by hardline military elements who would end the move toward representative government and most likely precipitate widespread and perhaps uncontrollable disorders in West Pakistan. In short, Yahya may only feel that his only course is to cut his and Pakistan‘s losses.

 

In short, Yahya appears to have decided to risk a confrontation with East Pakistan now in the slight hope that, if he pushed all the parties to the brink, a compromise might evolve from their coming to grips with the consequences of a split-up of Pakistan. Given the sentiment within the West Pakistani political-military establishment, he may have seen no other realistic choice.

 

U.S. Policy

As you know, we have so far attempted to remain neutral and uninvolved. Our line has been that we favor the unity of Pakistan and that it is up to the Pakistanis to determine the future of their country. There is at least a theoretical alternative (which one part of CIA holds out) of urging Yahya to take the third of the West Pakistanis opposed to Bhutto and try to reach accommodation with Rahman, but that would provoke a sharp reaction in the West, even perhaps in the army. State is not inclined to become involved in this way. This issue is still open, however.

 

Beyond that, we have these questions:
-Should the U.S. be hedging its bets with East Pakistan against the possibility that East secedes?
-If there is secession, how active should the U.S. be in trying to avoid bloodshed?
The contingency plan ordered in NSSM 118/5/ should be finished in the next twenty-four hours. I will send that to you as soon as it arrives with a recommendation on handling. We are after all witnessing the possible birth of a new nation of over 70 million people in an unstable area of Asia and, while not the controlling factor, we could have something to do with how this comes about-peacefully or by bloody civil war.

 

/5/ National Security Study Memorandum 118, directed by Kissinger on February 16 to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, called for a contingency study to be prepared outlining the possible range of U.S. reactions to movement in East Pakistan toward secession. See Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, Document 115.

 

Source: Document 2, volume XI, South Asia crisis 1971, Department of State.